At the Origins of Phenomenology: Logic, Psychology, Ontology.

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Keynote Addresses

Lotze’s Legacy for Phenomenology and Neo-Kantianism

Frederick Beiser (Syracuse University)

This paper treats Husserl’s complicated relationship with Hermann Lotze, both his debts to and critique of Lotze. I first sketch the reasons for Lotze’s influence on German philosophy in the late 19th and early 20th century. The chief reasons for this influence, I argue, arose from Lotze’s famous distinction between value and existence. This distinction played two basic roles: it solved “the crisis of philosophy” by giving it a subject matter (i.e., value) of its own distinct from the natural sciences; and it served as a bulwark against psychologism and naturalism, which were valid only for the realm of existence. Husserl was influenced by Lotze in both these respects and he accepted Lotze’s important distinction between value and existence. Apart from this very general influence, Lotze was also important for Husserl’s epistemology in the Logische Untersuchungen, especially his theory of truth. Lotze foreshadowed Husserl’s theory that logical truth is ideal and not only normative or psychological. Husserl’s main critique of Lotze is twofold: that he continued to confuse the ideal and normative; and that he posed an absurd question in asking about the correspondence of logic with reality. I defend Lotze against Husserl’s critique, which misidentified the kind of principles Lotze was worried about. I argue that Lotze was concerned about not logical principles per se but principles for the systematic organization of nature.

Husserl and Leibniz on Symbolic Thought and Symbolic Knowledge

Stefania Centrone (Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg)

Not yet available.
Session 1

Natorp, Husserl, and the Tortoise: On the possibility of logic as a normative science

Chad Kidd (CUNY City College of New York)

Husserl’s breakthrough to phenomenology was developed in Logical Investigations (LI) as an attempt to clarify the connection between mental reality and logical truth as it is conceived within the anti-psychologistic framework of the Prolegomena. In this paper, I will investigate whether Husserl’s attempts to forge this bond by phenomenological analysis can answer a peculiar kind of skeptical problem—which is suggested in Lewis Carroll’s “The Tortoise and Achilles”—concerning the normative bearing of logical truth on cognitive acts. I will argue that one of Natorp’s persistent criticisms of Husserl’s views in both LI and the first book of Ideas, concerning the possibility of the absolute givenness of a conscious act and the correlated givenness of its essence (eidos), is intimately related to this skeptical problem (even if Natorp himself didn’t recognize this). Furthermore, I will argue that Husserl’s attempts to address something like Natorp’s worry in the Formal and Transcendental Logic, while responding to some of Natorp’s challenge, do not address the aspect that relates to the heart of the Tortoise’s skeptical challenge—namely, what it is for a logical law to be recognized as (or, to be more precise, to be constituted by consciousness as) a norm that governs one’s cognitive acts. The upshot will be the recognition of a dimension of the domain of transcendental logical investigation that phenomenologists today must address.

Cassirer’s Theory of Abstraction in Comparison with Husserl

Andrea Carrocio (University of Rome Tor Vergata)

This talk is focused on a specific point of comparison between Husserl and Cassirer, that is to say the theory of abstraction. In order to see their compatibility, we will look at the origins of the two lines of thought. This is the reason why we will concentrate on Substance and Function and on the Second Logical Investigation. We will start from the first movement of Cassirer’s theory of knowledge, that is the critique of the statement of Aristotle. The entire difficulty of his account is due – in Cassirer’s viewpoint – to the concept of substance. To solve it, Cassirer tries to conceive of the opposition between universality and singularity outside of a metaphysical pattern by referring to the structure of the mathematical concepts. In the mathematical scheme of conceptualisation, what counts is the rule of connection. However, this structure of synthetic organisation of the data isn’t drawn from the variety of things: the concept that corresponds to the rule of construction of a certain manifold is the concept of function (Funktionsbegriff). Then, the problem that Cassirer must face is that, beside a new logical theory of formation of the concept, we need a psychological theory of its «grasp» that doesn’t need to have recourse to any kind of substance. This is – in the eyes of Cassirer – the case of Husserl’s theory of abstraction. Nevertheless, we will note that this proximity hides an important distinction between Husserl and Cassirer that will lead Cassirer to the reception of the descriptive level of Husserl’s phenomenology of abstraction, but also to the refusal of his logical and gnoseological level.
Session 2

The Ambiguity of Judgment: On A Decisive Distinction in the Early Dispute between Classical Phenomenology and Logical Psychologism

George Heffernan (Merrimack College)

There is a distinction at the origins of phenomenology that is foundational to Husserl’s first and following attempts to delineate the borders between the disciplines logic, psychology, and ontology. Throughout his *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, namely, runs the distinction between the real act (*Akt*) of judging (*Urteilen*) and the ideal formation (*Gebilde*) of judgment (*Urteil*). This distinction, which is also reflected in the English expression *judgment*, reveals an ambiguity in the concept *judgment*. Husserl’s refutation of psychologism has many strands of argumentation, but the rigorous distinction between the judging as an act and the judgment as a formation is the *Leitfaden* that connects them all. Husserl argues both for and from the distinction, and his entire phenomenological enterprise is doomed to failure without it. The reason is that one of the main aims of his entire philosophy is to apply intentional analysis to clarify how objective contents (*objektive Inhalte*) “constitute themselves” (*sich konstituieren*) in subjective experiences (*subjektive Erlebnisse*). Yet the distinction has received relatively little scholarly attention. In this paper, I attempt to accomplish three tasks: first, to identify the logical role of the distinction between the real act of judging and the ideal formation of judgment in the refutation of psychologism in the *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*; then, to determine its philosophical strengths and weaknesses, especially with respect to the evidence that is supposed to justify it; and finally, to explore several ways in which one can evaluate its phenomenological importance in Husserl’s three major works, *Logical Investigations*, *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy I*, and *Formal and Transcendental Logic*.

Husserl as Analytic Philosopher

Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock

In this paper I examine some philosophical problems, usually treated by analytic philosophers, to which Husserl made important contributions: issues in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of logic and mathematics and the philosophy of science. Some attention will be given to Husserl’s influence on philosophers in the analytic tradition.
Session 3


Claudio Tarditi (Università degli Studi di Torino)

The question of the *continuum* is central for both mathematics and phenomenology. Indeed, the flow of phenomenological data, as well as internal time-consciousness, are based upon the intuition of the continuum. As I will demonstrate through the discussion of Husserl’s and Weyl’s account of the continuum, the interaction between the intuitive and the mathematical continuum provides us with a perfect instance of the relation between what is constituting and what is constituted. Although a strong tension between intuition and formalization is peculiar of all the manifold perspectives on the continuum (from Aristotle to Cantor, via Leibniz), such a complex relation is insightfully addressed in Hermann Weyl’s project of a phenomenological foundation of physics. In my intervention, I will aim at clarifying the impact of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology – notably, his theory of perception developed in the *Dingvorlesungen* (1907), as well as his account of time-consciousness in the 1905-08 lectures – on Weyl’s account of the continuum. Accordingly, in my presentation I will approach the problem of Husserl’s influence on Weyl’s account of the continuum in order to show how his project of a phenomenological foundation for mathematical knowledge, far from being just a purely logical and metamathematical investigation of mathematics, is to be understood as an attempt for a phenomenological reconstruction of the world. My core thesis is that, whereas Weyl’s account of transcendental residuum is clearly influenced by the §49 of *Ideen I*, his perspective on intuitive and mathematical continuum is to be understood within the framework of Husserl’s theory of spatiotemporal perception developed in the *Dingvorlesungen* as well as in the lectures on time-consciousness from 1905-08.
Session 4A

‘Object’ as a Functional Concept. On Husserl’s Early Theory of Intentionality

Andrea Marchesi (Sapienza University of Rome)

The talk aims at debating Husserl’s theory of intentionality as it appears in Logical Investigations and in some other early writings. In the first section, we will attempt at capturing the core of Husserl’s concept of intentionality by identifying three theses: (1) that intentionality is a property; (2) that intentionality entails a relation and (3) that intentionality does not depend upon veridicality. The second section is devoted to a detailed analysis of the account of intentional relation developed in the 5th Logical Investigation. First, we will argue that in Husserlian ontology a proposition such as ‘every intentional experience has an object’ should be thought to be analytic; secondly, we will deal with the issue by using contemporary notions of ‘property’. In the third section, we will claim that the 6th Logical Investigation provides us with a concept of ‘object’ which is merely functional, and we will try to flesh out what does it mean. In the fourth section, we will debate Husserl’s conception of intentionality in the light of the mereology outlined in the 3rd Logical Investigation. In the fifth section, we will explain how Husserl criticizes the so-called theory of immanent objects and how he addresses the problem of non-existents. In that context, we will challenge the Süßbauer-Künne reading and clarify Husserl’s concept of ‘existence’. In the last section, we will contend that a phenomenological theory of intentionality cannot be a non-relational one. In this regard, we will also compare Husserl’s account with the adverbial account and the parametric account.

At the Crossroad of two Genetic Traditions. Husserl, Natorp, and the Concept of Time

Nicolás Trujillo Osorio (Leiden University/Diego Portales University)

A more or less well-known topic in the current field of phenomenology is the Natorp - Husserl debate. Traditionally, the debate has been addressed to analyze the concepts, arguments, and methods Husserl may or may not have taken from Paul Natorp Philosophy of Psychology (Kern 1964; Luft 2010; Dahlstrom 2015; Lembeck 2003; Kim 1974; Welton 2003; Staiti 2014; Kim 1974; Arlt 1985). While the discussions had in this debate have been useful for highlighting certain similarities between reconstruction and reduction – and, by extension, between Neo-Kantianism and phenomenology in general—, it is also true that Natorp’s philosophy is mostly overlooked in this context. Precisely along these lines, the hypothesis that Husserl’s phenomenology – particularly his genetic phenomenology – emerged as the true execution of Natorp’s psychology has become nearly a commonplace in the literature (Luft 2010; Dahlstrom 2015; Kern 1964). In my opinion, this hypothesis is too partial to be true. In particular, this unilateral approach fails to take into account at least two significant facts regarding the debate. On the one hand, Husserl’s and Natorp’s mutual criticism of each other. On the other hand, Natorp’s systematic definition of “consciousness”. In this talk, I will analyze both these overlooked aspects in order to demonstrate that the Husserl-Natorp debate turns out to be an exemplary case of a historical confrontation between two different genetic traditions in Austro-German Philosophy.
Husserl on the Logic of Existential Judgements: From Sigwart to the Transcendental Phenomenology and a Reassessment of Frege

Peter Andras Varga (Hungarian Academy of Sciences)

The aim of my paper is to reconstruct a particular episode of late nineteenth – early twentieth century presymbolical, philosophical logic, namely Edmund Husserl’s evolving stance on the logical problems posed by existential judgements. As I am going to argue, this episode not only exemplifies a thematically and historically coherent thread in the history of traditional, philosophical logic, but it is also instructive with regard to interactions between Early Phenomenology and the contemporaneous German academic philosophy (Universitätsphilosophie), as well as the development of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenological philosophy. Prior to his preoccupation with the content-object distinction prompted by Twardowski (1894) in mid-1894, Husserl was, as a recently published text demonstrate (Husserl 2009, esp. 34–35), surprisingly willing to side with Sigwart’s logical analysis of the existential judgements, even though he maintained that Brentano is right psychologically, insofar as the relation itself does not belong to what is directly presented by the judgement. Husserl’s claim, according to which every existential judgement “presupposes the relation between a representing presentation and the thing, but only logically” (35), was certainly extended to a phenomenological basis by the introduction of the theory of fulfilsments in the Sixth Logical Investigation. I argue that the hitherto less studied bifurcate controversy about impersonal and existential judgements could be regarded as a linking element between Early Phenomenology and the Universitätsphilosophie, respectively between Husserl and other members of the School of Brentano.

Husserl’s Early Reception of Bolzanian Propositions

Hynek Janoušek (Czech Academy of Sciences)

The integration of Bolzano’s famous concept of a proposition in-itself, which forms a core of Bolzano’s logical realism, into Husserl’s early phenomenology belongs within the context of Husserl’s deeper move against the supposed psychologism of his Philosophy of Arithmetic. This paper tries to reconstruct Husserl’s early failed attempt to avoid the pitfall of psychologism by using a Brentanian theory of abstraction. This failure opened the way for a more positive appreciation of Bolzano’s concept of a proposition in-itself in Husserl’s philosophy. I argue that problems concerning the acceptance of propositions in themselves by Husserl were constituted on one side by Brentano’s theory of the relation of judgments to presentations and his theory of evidence and, on the other side, by Erdmann’s insight into the relationship between the concept of states of affairs and the multiplicity of propositional attitudes. After a period of identifying Bolzano’s propositions with states of affairs, Husserl used Twardowski’s distinction of intentional content and intentional object to differentiate between propositions and states of affairs and correlated Bolzano’s propositions with evident judgments. This differentiation helped Husserl to distinguish several complementary concepts of truth and to separate propositional thoughts on one side and propositions on the other. These concepts of truth are all grouped around Husserl’s descriptions of presence of propositions in themselves in our psychical life.
Session 5A

Syncategorematica in Husserl and Aristotle

Charlene Elsby (IPFW)

In attempting to locate the essence of the syncategorematica, Husserl builds upon the statements made by Aristotle. In the Poetics, Aristotle establishes a hierarchy of the parts of diction, the lowest of which is a letter and the highest of which is speech. The particular syncategorematica to which Husserl refers exist one step above syllables (which are parts of words, as opposed to parts of speech) but below names (which would be considered categorematica). Amongst the syncategorematica are conjunctions and articles, and Aristotle’s theory of them is given in only a few lines of text, which are highly corrupt in comparison to the rest of the corpus. Still, we can see a kind of theory of syncategorematica and their function. In this paper I will point out the correlation between Aristotle’s use of “non-significant” in this context with Husserl’s use of “non-independent meaning”. Both usages negate the concept that the function of language is exclusively referential. Instead, the syncategorematica function as meaningful in the Husserlian sense—as that which intends but requires something else for its completion. While the referent of a categorematic term completes its meaning function, the syncategorematica are concretized in relation to other parts of language and reach completion in a unified act of meaning.

Diachronic truth validity conditions and the transcendental reduction:
Attending to the continuity of Husserl’s various discussions of classical Greek mathematics

Michael Weinman (Bard College Berlin)

Here I will show that Husserl’s unfinished project of a phenomenological account of the origins of geometry, unlike much of the pioneering and intellectually rich work done on the history of Greek mathematics at the time Husserl engaged with the issue, tends in the direction of what I shall call a diachronic view of the contemporaneity of ideas. Such a view, which I oppose to both an anachronic view (like that of Zeuthen, e.g.) and a synchronic view (like that of Badiou, e.g.), has been championed by Sabetai Unguru and was practiced by Jacob Klein. It holds that whatever in the past is legible to us can be understood only when we take it up in the fullness of its irretrievably past contemporaneity. Insofar as Husserl’s attempts to think the conditions of diachronic truth validity with respect to Greek mathematics have this essential character, I will argue, a return to Husserl’s project and an exploration of how, in fuller form, it might support the diachronic reception of Greek mathematics, remains very much of the moment for reflections in the philosophy of mathematics, in epistemology, and in metaphysics (or ontology) today. It is just such an exposition and extension of Husserl’s thinking about the history and the philosophy of mathematics that the present work intends to present and defend, notwithstanding and indeed very much hoping to recuperate much that is worthy of further thought in the anachronic and synchronic traditions of thinking about the conceptual content of Greek mathematics and its importance for both modern science and contemporary philosophy.
Session 5B

Phenomenology of the Spheres: Manchester, Mahnke, and Conrad Martius

Randy Dible (SUNY Stony Brook)

Peter Byrne Manchester's 2005 book The Syntax of Time identifies a lost Ancient Greek doctrine called the sphericity (sphaerike) at the foundation of the ancient phenomenology of time. This method of this phenomenology of time fits the spanned interval of the “now” into the paradigm of eternity as a sphere. This sphere has a rich heritage: it is the infinite sphere, the sphaera infinita of Nicolas de Cusa, the Stoic-Neoplatonic “Sphere of the All,” or Timaean “Sphere of the Paradigm.” This method calls for a generalization to all dimensions of space-time. This generalization is already underway in certain parts of cosmological and possible-worlds phenomenology. In this presentation, I will focus on the application of Manchester’s insights to the history of geometry given in Dietrich Mahnke’s 1937 Unendliche Sphäre und Allmittelpunkt, and Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ 1950s phenomenology of space-time as described in her Die Zeit (1954), Das Sein (1957), and Der Raum (1958). Conrad-Martius’ notions of aeonic space-time and apeiric space-time will be explored in part to extend the range of the spherical world-model. The reactivation of the original intuition of sphericity can establish a phenomenology of the spheres that positions our world in the all-encompassing ontological framework of a unified cosmological phenomenology. The role of the monad and indefinite dyad in both number and figure, and the sphere as the ultimate metrological unit, are themes that will be systematically explored as we prepare to re-enter the paradigm of the sphere through the Sphere of the Paradigm.

Real Reality? Conrad-Martius vs. Husserl’s Ideas I

Rodney K.B. Parker (Paderborn University)

In the years following the publication of Ideas I, many of Husserl’s students raised objections to his newly articulated phenomenological idealism. The Munich phenomenologists – the majority of whom were ardent realists – were particularly critical of this move. The writings of Hedwig Conrad-Martius are representative of the backlash against Husserl’s idealism. A key text that circulated among the Göttingen Circle was her short manuscript titled Über Ontologie (Conrad-Martius ca.1916), written the same year her essay “Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt” was published in the Jahrbuch (Conrad-Martius 1916). In this paper, I discuss the contents of Conrad-Martius’ unpublished 1916 manuscript, and her criticisms of Husserl therein. I attempt to elaborate on these arguments by explaining the concepts of “real reality” and Gegenstandphänomenologie [object-phenomenology] that were central to the phenomenology developed by the members of the Munich Circle. Conrad-Martius’ main gripe with Husserl’s transcendental-constitutive phenomenology is his positioning of the absolute existence of the transcendental ego, and his attempt to relativize all subsequent being to the constituting I. According to her, Husserl thereby falls into the same trap as all previous idealisms. I argue that Conrad-Martius has, as Husserl thought, misunderstood part of his argument, and that her counter-positioning of the existence in-itself of the external world is more problematic.
Session 6A

Negative Propositions, Negative States of Affairs, and the Significance of the Copula in Hypothetical and Disjunctive Propositions

Mark Roberts (Franciscan University of Steubenville)

Bolzano’s work on propositions departed radically from the Aristotelian view, prevalent at the time, that truth bearers are judgments understood as mental entities that result from the mind composing and dividing concepts. Bolzano argued that propositions, truth bearers, are neither mental entities nor dependent upon minds. Although he did not examine the role of the copula in propositions, and did not introduce the notion of states of affairs as truth makers, he paved the way for this to be done by later phenomenologists; in particular Alexander Pfänder and Adolf Reinach. In this paper I proceed in the following way. First, I briefly examine the view of Bolzano on propositions in contrast to the Aristotelian view. Second, I examine the significance of the copula and its logical status for mind independent propositions. Using the contributions of Pfänder in his Logic and Reinach in his “On the Negative Judgment” I show how predication must be understood as a logical function in the copula and not a mental process of composing and dividing, or asserting. I argue that without an appreciation of the logical function of the copula in propositions, the Aristotelian view cannot explain negative predication nor can it explain what makes negative propositions true. Because the copula is a syncategorematic logical predicative function in propositions, and not a mental process, truth makers for propositions must reflect this predicative function, and this applies both to affirmative and to negative propositions. Lastly, I apply a number of these points to the role of the copula in hypothetical and disjunctive propositions.

Experience in J.F. Herbart’s Philosophy and Psychology

Nadia Moro (National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow)

Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841) thought that Immanuel Kant – Herbart’s predecessor in Königsberg – had not been able to bring his critical enterprise to completion. It was Herbart’s aim to perfect Kant’s philosophy and solve its alleged methodological shortcomings. To this end Herbart addressed not the conditions of possible experience in general, but rather the explanation of determinate experience and its objective forms. Herbart deemed it necessary to examine the given forms of experience under the auspices of realism, pluralism, and scientific psychology. As well as space and time, considered by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, harmonic tone relations, such as intervals and chords, count for Herbart as various qualitative orders that are progressively constituted in psychic activity. Similarly, Kant’s static determination of the categories is rejected by Herbart, who emphasizes the role of language in the dynamic development of the categories; on his account, they do not correspond to the judgments of formal logic, but rather depend on linguistic activity. Herbart’s psychology was aimed to amend Kant’s transcendental approach and produce a more comprehensive philosophical theory of experience and knowledge. This paper is based on recent Italian and French interpretations of Herbart and reconstructs methodological and conceptual issues in Herbart’s major philosophical texts. Herbart’s psychological analysis of unity, multiplicity, synthesis, and differentiation in terms of ‘serial forms’ will be illustrated, showing that Herbart’s questions revolve around determinate experience, and turn the problem of synthesis into one of discrimination. The goal is to show that Herbart’s functionalist psychology and his philosophical theory of experience led to the development of early phenomenological views.
Session 6B

Psychology, Philosophy and Law: The Approaches that Comprise Reinach’s Jurisprudence

Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray (King’s University College, UWO)

Adolf Reinach is exemplar of the interdisciplinary approach and spirit of the Munich Circle around the turn of the 20th century. In 1901, at the age of 17, he entered the University of Munich. His main areas of study included psychology and philosophy under Theodor Lipps, and then jurisprudence, where he studied with Lujo Brentano and befriended Hermann Kantorowicz (founder of the Freirechtsschule). Regarding philosophy, Reinach’s work was profoundly influenced by Lipps, who had his own phenomenology already in 1900 in addition to descriptive psychology, but also by Johannes Daubert, a fellow student who exposed Reinach and others to the ideas of the School of Brentano. Lipps and the fellow students Reinach came to know in the Psychology club (and their interdisciplinary spirits) helped shape his work in important ways. Reinach’s academic life lasted only 16 years, and produced a handful of publications, but throughout it he maintained an interdisciplinary approach where descriptive psychology had a positive and necessary role to play with phenomenology and jurisprudence. When you consider the theoretical distance and independence Reinach maintained from Husserl even after moving to Göttingen, it becomes clear that this is largely due to his interdisciplinary approach. In this presentation, I want to discuss and flesh out this interdisciplinary approach of Reinach’s, looking mainly to his 1913 his article on the a priori foundations of civil law, but touching on his 1904 dissertation and 1913 work ‘On Deliberation’.

From the Concept of Evidence in the Early Husserl to the Prospect of a Generative Phenomenological Science

Dennis Skocz (Independent Scholar)

This paper examines the notion of evidence as initially articulated in Husserl’s Logical investigations. The notion of evidence that emerges in the Investigations will be compared with the “breakthrough” concept of same in Husserl’s The Idea of Phenomenology. I hope to trace the development of a concept of evidence that goes from being a subordinate theme in the foundations of logic to playing a central role in phenomenological method and finally to anticipating the concept of evidence in Heidegger and inviting to play a generative role in phenomenological research. The focus of The Idea on cognition and the immanent data of consciousness may seem at first a limitation and a restriction to a closed world of abstraction. It is clear, however, that Husserl sees this domain of the selbstgegeben as brimming with possibilities of investigation which embrace many regions of objectivities and levels of being. In The Idea, it is precisely the notion of evidence as what opens and invites inquiry rather than the more common one of a proof or insight that settles a question and establishes the truth of a matter that is articulated and that breaks new ground. And, one should add, it comes at a time when Husserl was looking to advance a programmatic vision of phenomenology as a distinctive philosophical science.
Session 7A

Roman Ingarden’s Ontology of the Picture

Robert Luzecky (IPFW)

One of the primary results of Ingarden’s ontology of the artistic painting (i.e., the “picture”) is that its unique ontologically stratified structure conditions implies an involvement with the viewer that suggests a type of life. In the present paper, I elucidate Ingarden’s ontology of the picture in order to 1) clarify Ingarden’s modification of Husserl’s remarks about paintings, and 2) demonstrate that Ingarden’s ontological analyses of the picture present yield the conclusion that the picture enjoys a peculiar kind of life. Husserl notes (in Ideas) that a painting (as a spatio-temporally extended object) is non-identical to a picture (as the object of aesthetic contemplation). The framed canvas covered with pigments of various hues hanging on the wall of the art gallery is not the same thing as the object which enjoys existence as an aesthetic object. While Husserl (notoriously) suggests that the latter is not real, Ingarden substantially modifies and supplements Husserl’s observations about the picture’s ontological structure to demonstrate that the picture is an ontologically stratified real object that involves both material and ideal components. The picture’s ontological strata form a complex “harmony” that unifies its (analytically discrete) ontological processes and parts. This harmony is what allows the picture’s concretization. I suggest that Ingarden’s conceptualization of the ontology of the picture implies that it enjoys a type of life in the limited but essential sense that it demonstrates a type of purposiveness that is derived from its having the properties of an organic unity. That pictures fulfill two (minimal) conditions of life (i.e., purposiveness and organic unity) implies that pictures are alive.

Roman Ingarden’s Ontology of Intentional Objects

Gabriel Marko (Charles University Prague)

This paper provides an overview of development of Ingarden’s ontology of intentional objects between 1918 and 1948. The aim is to prove the claim that Ingarden’s ontology of intentional objects came out of the epistemological problem of absolute theory of knowledge, formulated in his dissertation, and gradually transformed into an important tool in his discussion of metaphysical questions of the idealism-realism problem in the Controversy over the Existence of the World. This transformation has three phases. The first phase started in 1918 with Ingarden’s return to Poland and his rejection of both Husserl’s transcendental idealism and the prevailing trends in Polish philosophy. This led him to develop his own account of phenomenology and to move from the problem of absolute theory of knowledge to the problem of its ontological foundations. The period ends with his Habilitationsschrift called On Essential Questions finished in 1923. Ingarden’s critique of epistemological conventionalism in this text contains his first considerations about the ontology of intentional objects. The second phase from 1924 to 1931 is the period of formation of the idealism-realism problem and the genesis of Ingarden’s book The Literary Work of Art which was meant to be a preparation for discussion of this problem. The book introduces the concept of purely intentional objects and provides extensive analyses of their ontological structure and their functions in epistemology and aesthetics. In the third phase, which ends with the publication of the second volume of the Controversy, Ingarden develops the concept of intentional object mainly in his aesthetics. However, in the Controversy the concept of intentional objects becomes substantial for the exact formulation of the idealism-realism problem and discussions about related metaphysical questions.
Session 7B

Husserl on Founding Variation

Vicente Muñoz-Reja (Boston College)

In this paper, I aim to thematize what I call ‘founding variation’. Husserl encounters such variation in the Third of his Logical Investigations. However, he does not name, develop or problematize it. Husserl explicitly argues for (1) the postulate stating that every content-object is a whole or a part; founding or founded, which merely constitutes the formal condition for the qualification of any content-object whatsoever; and (2) the principle of free variation, which constitutes the material condition for the qualification of a given content-object as part and/or whole given a unique founded series articulated by a law of essence. This is the criterion used to establish that this content-object belongs to a single founded series (law of essence). I claim that Husserl notices but does not develop, at least in the context of the theory of wholes and parts, (3) a principle of founding variation that accounts for the experience that one single content-object can present itself as belonging to more than one single founded series or law of essence. This principle of founding variation constitutes a condition for the qualification of a given content-object as alternative part and whole, and as alternatively part of a whole and part of a different whole, given more than one founded series.

Husserl and the Epistemological Necessity of a Strict Reduction

Stefano Vincini (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México)

The question of whether or not my belief in the world is justified poses a problem: it seems impossible to exhibit an epistemic ground for the world’s existence because anything that can be employed to this purpose relies on the very thing it is supposed to ground. In this sense, the neo-Friesian philosopher Leonard Nelson attempted to show the impossibility of epistemology by arguing that it is inevitably prey to the petitio principii fallacy. The problem was also discussed by Ingarden. I use Nelson’s and Ingarden’s discussions of epistemic circularity as a point of departure to address Husserl’s texts. I argue that one of Husserl’s motivations for the phenomenological reduction is precisely to make possible a solution to the epistemological problem of the world’s justifiability. In particular, in the first section of the paper, I examine how in a number of texts from Ideas to Crisis the requirement of avoiding epistemic circularity imposes a strict constraint on philosophical inquiry: in order to exhibit the epistemic ground for the world belief, experience, or subjectivity, must be considered without presupposing the world’s existence. In the second section, I sketch Husserl’s solution, which consists in carrying out systematic analyses under strict observance of the phenomenological reduction. In a formula, experience grounds belief, i.e. it provides rational justification for positing a transcendent world infinitely beyond my actual experience. In this context, it is necessary to specify (a) the relevant opposition between “immanence” and “transcendence” and (b) the Husserlian idea of a general relationship between concordance (Einstimmigkeit) and epistemic justification.
Heidegger’s issue is not with formality *as such* but with the articulation of its *rigorous*, i.e. *in principle conception* – this Heidegger says, remains to date inadequately addressed. Heidegger was right, though I suggest the outline of a plausible response is available today. To be sure the *particular* formalisms proposed themselves may well be inadequate (they may fail to adequately capture the intended meaning of the logic laws), but Heidegger’s intended diagnosis and revision goes further than that. In its treatment of the ‘formal rules of thought’, this logic is unclear: it fails before the question of its own lawfulness (i.e. its normativity) and characterization of truth. (This is not achieved either with Frege, Brouwer or Hilbert; yet the advances achieved by each retain their relevance.) As far as Heidegger is concerned, this means it fails to have clarified its relation to a ‘transcendental logic’ – *thus to being-in-the-world* and the finitude proper to Dasein. Thus: ‘logic should change; it should become philosophical!’ On this basis, a few years after Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, Heidegger writes *Beiträge*: ‘In the usual horizon of logic and of the predominant thinking, the projection of the grounding of truth remains pure arbitrariness, and only here is the way free to the infinite and apparently exhaustive questioning back into the truth of the truth of the truth’. Girard’s ‘transcendental syntax’ program proposes an in principle understanding of logic in the sense Heidegger requires: logic must be second-order; it must become philosophical, and it is best conceived today as a *transcendental syntax*. As such it intends to become genuinely explanatory with respect to both the normativity and conception of truth operative with logic.
Session 8B

**Daubert’s naïve realist challenge to the Husserlian account of perception**

*Matt Bower (Texas State University)*

Although naïve realism has become a major topic of discussion in the philosophy of perception in recent years, that fact is not reflected in the work of phenomenologically-influenced philosophers grappling with the nature of perceptual experience. That’s not so surprising when you take into account the centrality of the notion of intentionality within the phenomenological tradition and the fact that naïve realism involves a denial that perceptual experience is intentionality-laden. There is, however, precedent for naïve realism among phenomenologists. Johannes Daubert, little known due to his total lack of publication, held the view. Edmund Husserl, whose view is sometimes presented in a way that resembles naïve realism due to its appeal to *de re*, object-involving content, did not in fact endorse that view, as I explain. After laying out the case for thinking of Daubert as a naïve realist by piecing together remarks from his unpublished manuscripts, I assess how far this removes his view from Husserl’s and conclude that Daubert ultimately shares little common ground with Husserl on the topic. His view not only diverges from Husserl’s, but also, I argue, has certain advantages over Husserl’s in the way that it deals with phenomenal change that takes place when perceiving a single, unchanged object.

**Theodor Lipps on the Concept of Einfühlung**

*Timothy Burns (Loyola Marymount University)*

Theodor Lipps is the first philosopher to develop the concept of *Einfühlung* in order to explain how one subject comes to understand the experiences of another subject. His theory is crucial to the subsequent development of descriptions of *Einfühlung* offered by members of the early phenomenological movement such as Edith Stein, Max Scheler, and Edmund Husserl—even if their reaction to Lipps’s account is mostly one of rejection. His theory has also seen something of a resurgence in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, particularly amongst those who defend a version of Simulation Theory in the mind-reading debate. The purpose of this paper is to return to Lipps’s account of *Einfühlung* with three goals in view. The first goal is an explication of his theory. This is useful given the forthcoming translation into English of Lipps’s seminal essay, “*Das Wissen von fremden Ichern*,” and since so little of Lipps’s work has been translated into English. The second goal is to analyze the objections against this theory raised within the early phenomenological movement. I will attempt to synthesize objections that Stein, Scheler, and Husserl raise against Lipps into a series of coherently phenomenological objections against his position. The final goal is to analyze the debate in order to determine whether or not early phenomenologists got Lipps’s theory right, whether their objections are in fact decisive, or whether Lipps’s theory might have more going for it than is usually suggested by his critics.
Session 9

Logic and Language in Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*

**Petr Urban (Czech Academy of Sciences)**

The main aim of the proposed talk is to revisit and reassess the account of language at the origins of Husserl’s phenomenology with a special focus on the *Logical Investigations*. I want to argue that there is an ambivalence peculiar to Husserl’s discussion of language in the *Logical Investigations*: Husserl, on the one hand, is widely engaged in language as one of the most important symbolic systems and a prerequisite of scientific knowledge and he emphasizes the role of linguistic discussions as ‘the philosophically indispensable preparations for the building of pure logic; on the other hand, he applies the idea of a fundamental distinction between the realm of the ideal and real being to his view of logic, science and language, which finally leads him to interpret the relationship between logic, scientific knowledge and language as an inessential one. In the first part of the talk, I will focus on the origins of Husserl’s interest in language which coincides with his interest in non-intuitive symbolic thought and symbolic systems in general. The second part of the talk will be devoted to the rather underappreciated presentation of the importance of ‘linguistic discussions’ in Husserl’s Introduction to the second volume of the *Logical Investigations*. Third and finally, I aim to analyze a reverse side of the Husserlian account of language in the *Logical Investigations* which, in my view, is essentially linked to the presumption of the fundamental difference between the ideal and real being.

**Husserl’s Early Philosophy of Computation and its Origin in the School of Brentano**

**Carlo Ierna (University of Groningen/Czech Academy of Sciences)**

The philosophy of mathematics was a shared interest in the School of Brentano, serving as the paradigmatic example for the notion of symbolic intentionality. The Brentanist philosophy of mathematics can accommodate both the a priori, deductive, analytical status of mathematics as well as a posteriori practices, such as the use of logarithmic tables and calculators as tools for thought. I will discuss the parallel developments in this respect in Husserl and Ehrenfels and how these grew out of a shared Brentanist framework. Husserl argues that we cannot avoid using symbolic presentations in mathematics. Hence, we need a sign-system to ensure that they can serve as a valid substitute of proper presentations. However, we have to account for a double symbolic layer. On the one hand, we use symbolic presentations as equivalent to properly presented numbers. On the other, we externalize these mental symbols into physical symbols. Yet, once we’re using symbols, it does not matter whether the computation takes place in the mind: we have already accepted a division of labor in which we outsource some of the computation to “physical aides”: whether pencil and paper or a calculator. When discussing calculation through “blind psychological mechanisms”, Husserl considers whether these might work in the same way as physical mechanisms. The correctness of the result depends on the validity of the deductive process: as long as the calculation is correct, we should accept the results whether they were done mentally or physically.