Keynote Addresses

**Surprise as Emotion: Between Startle and Humility**

*Anthony Steinbock (Southern Illinois University, Carbondale)*

I examine surprise in terms of its belief structure, clarifying it as a believing that I cannot believe, and ultimately distinguishing it from a startle (1). I then suggest that surprise is a being caught off-guard that is related to being attentively turned toward something (2). As the latter, I qualify surprise as an emotion in its being thrown back on an experience in a way that is different from affectively turning toward something (3). This constitutes surprise as a disequilibrium in distinction to a diremptive experience like we find in the moral emotions of shame or guilt (4). Finally—and contrary to a common interpretation—I distinguish surprise, which presupposes the futural orientation as an expectation, from a gift, which is peculiar to the experience of humility and which (while it has its own futural temporality) is that in which precisely nothing is expected.
The War Writings of Max Scheler and Edmund Husserl  
*James Dodd (New School for Social Research)*  

This paper explores two contemporary responses of philosophers to the First World War, Edmund Husserl's lectures “Fichte's Ideal of Humanity” and Max Scheler’s “The Genius of War and the German War.” The aim of the paper is to situate these writings against the historical backdrop of the First World War, and assess their strengths and weaknesses with regard to the deeply problematic task of a philosophical response to modern war.

**Emotions, Value, and Action**  
*John Drummond (Fordham University)*  

The early phenomenologists writing on the emotions anticipated by well over a hundred years the revised interest in the emotions across the philosophical world. My aim in this paper is to consider the main issues at work in their writings and to demonstrate the continuing value of their reflections in contemporary philosophy's revived consideration of the emotions. I shall explore some of the main agreements and disagreements among the early phenomenologists in order to develop a sketch of the emotions centered on three theses: refer to these views as (1) the intentional thesis, (2) the (reformulated) foundational thesis, and (3) the evaluative thesis. In conclusion, I shall briefly discuss the relation of the emotions to action.
Session 1A

Scheler and Guyau’s Vitalist Ethics
Olivier Asgard (Université Paris-Sorbonne)

Among French philosophers at the turn of the 20th century, Scheler’s philosophy is linked not only to Henri Bergson, but also to Jean-Marie Guyau. When Scheler comes to reflect on the relativity of values to life, he refers to Guyau, the author of the famous *Esquisse d’une moralité sans obligation ni sanction* (1885) – a copy of which can be found in Scheler’s library containing annotations that reflect a careful reading. This paper aims to show that the confrontation with *vitalist ethics* and in particular with Guyau is an important moment in Scheler’s ethical reflections. Scheler shared with Guyau the double criticism of utilitarian and Kantian ethics, to which both philosophers opposed a certain idea of life, love and humanity. The analysis of Guyau’s ideas and their reception by Scheler can help clarify the singular positioning of Scheler who received important impulses from the French philosophy of life, but tried to combine them with a phenomenological approach. Secondly, I will address the issue of the political consequences of this ethical reflection, by considering the notion of *solidarity*. For Guyau, the idea of solidarity has its basis in life, and Scheler takes up this idea in *Der Formalismus*. This idea of a natural foundation of solidarity was also developed by Peter Kropotkin, who was an admirer of Guyau. For Kropotkin as for Guyau, altruism has a biological basis and is prior to egoism. In this matter too, Scheler adopts a unique position: he agrees with this criticism of Social Darwinism, but draws political consequences that depart from those of Guyau and Kropotkin because he remains attached to a certain conception of the *Geist*.

Max Scheler and Henri Bergson on Authority
Adriana Alfaro Altamirano (Harvard University)

In this paper, I will present the reflections of two less well-known authors within the canon of political philosophy: Max Scheler and Henri Bergson. Each of these authors develops a distinctive philosophical anthropology centered on a rich notion of the person, which becomes the cornerstone of their social and ethical reflections. Furthermore, they both present, albeit in different ways, a positive account of personal authority—i.e., a kind of authority that is based neither on the legitimacy granted by a procedure (as in political authority), nor on scientific or rational knowledge (as in what has been called “epistemic” authority). Scheler’s and Bergson’s respective accounts are distinct both from the Ancient account of natural superiority and inequality, and from the Weberian charismatic figure. They are both based on a particular account of inner diversity: in the case of Scheler, the diversity of feelings and values arranged hierarchically, which constitutes what he calls the *ordo amoris*; in the case of Bergson, the diversity proper to *élan vital*, which is the trademark of the heterogeneous and always-in-flux inner life of a being that exists in time. Herein I explore their respective accounts of inner diversity, in order to connect them to their respective accounts of the authority that resides in exemplary people. This examination will suggest two different, but related, accounts of what moral education should look like, when the “force” and “effectiveness” of exemplars in history is duly acknowledged, without for that reason neglecting the importance of individual autonomy. I believe that their reflections can bring fresh insights to contemporary debates about authority, understood as a broader phenomenon and not only in its “political” or “epistemic” character.
Edmund Husserl’s early axiology – 1902 to approximately 1920 – is comprised of two main themes. First, he develops a formal axiology that investigates the formal possibilities for the combination of axiological meanings. Second, he outlines a material axiology through a phenomenology of evaluative acts. Husserl situates his early material axiology between the ethics of feeling (Gefühlsmoral) and ethics of understanding (Verstandesmoral) and phenomenologically extends Franz Brentano’s account of the descriptive psychology of evaluative intentionality. Generally speaking, Husserl positions his account of evaluative intentionality between the voluntarism and sentimentalism of the ethics of feeling and the intellectualism of the ethics of understanding. While he denounces the subjectivism of the ethics of feeling, he nevertheless maintains that axiology is ultimately grounded in acts of feeling and non-evaluative presentations. While evaluative intentionality inherently includes a feeling moment, this feeling moment does not compromise the objectivity of goods and the ideal validity of ethical principles. Husserl thus positions his material axiology between the intellectualist and voluntarist traditions in moral philosophy. This paper develops several aspects of Husserl’s position – belief modalities and evaluative characteristics involved in bodily feelings - and addresses a basic tension in the relationship between cognitive and affective content.

A Constitution Theory of Moral Intuition

Søren Engelsen (University of Southern Denmark)

Drawing on points found in Scheler and Husserl, the paper considers moral intuition to be a composite intentional state presenting a moral subject matter in a non-inferential mode of presentation. It is constituted by passive syntheses of phenomenal content. Three constitutive moments are reconstructed in phenomenological analysis: Moral intuitions are founded on simpler experiences of value originally given in intentional feeling. Self-regarding feelings of value function as the basic ‘building blocks’ in the constitution of higher-order evaluative states. A second constitutive moment of a moral intuition is the appearance of other-regarding axiological content: This involves a non-inferential transference of meaning from the subject’s own self-regarding experiences of felt values to what is presented as the other’s experience containing type-identical axiological contents. This makes possible the consideration of other-regarding value in a direct, non-inferential mode of presentation. A third constitutive moment of moral intuition is the balancing of value contents: The mature moral agent can sometimes in one and the same Gestalt experience simultaneously co-present various reasons for action provided by the relative weight of given value qualities ‘absorbing’ each other with regards to their relevance. This enables the sufficiently skilled moral agent to automatically ‘interpret’ a situation, norm, act, person or abstract principle in light of the relative weight of the reason-providing axiological contents intended, something which arguably enables the mature moral agent to bring a decisive moral reason to intuition.
Session 2A

What Value Contributes to Moral Disposition: Scheler’s Axiological Revision of Kant’s notion of Gesinnung

Eric Mohr (St. Vincent College)

In this paper, I explore the theoretical differences and practical implications with respect to the way Scheler both rejects and incorporates Kant’s idea of Gesinnung, or “disposition” into his own ethics of value and corresponding view of moral action. Scheler is influenced greatly by Kant’s employment of the idea of a disposition (an underlying Maxim for our maxims) that orients the will toward and in accord with the moral law (or against the moral law, whatever the case may be). However, Scheler rejects Kant’s legalistic interpretation, where the goodness of the will resides in its conformity to the moral law exclusively, and suggests an axiological revision of the concept, which takes its moral character from its orientation toward values, of which conformity to law is only one among many others. The implications of this change are profound in many ways, but I will focus here on just two. First, the versatility of our language of moral states that Scheler’s view allows for, retrieves a connection with classical virtue ethics that Kant’s view does not allow for. Second, while there are many different ways that we can be morally attuned to values and the world, for Scheler, a loving disposition is the condition for the others. Incorporating love into a Kantian moral framework is not without some significant difficulty. Perhaps the greatest strength of Kant’s moral theory is also that which maintains the morally irrelevance of love: we should enact our duty to others whether we love them or we don’t. Here I will consider concrete scenarios that highlight the differences (strengths and weakness) with respect to the way value directs the will (for Scheler) and the way practical reason directs the will (for Kant). I intend to show here that despite the differences in the way they may possibly play out, the two are not mutually exclusive.

Emotions and the Body

Zachary Davis (St. John’s University)

Not available.
Session 2B

On Love and other Reasons: How should we understand Husserl's self-criticism of his formal axiology?

Henning Peucker (Universität Paderborn)

Early Husserlian ethics is grounded upon a formal axiology according to which the relations between values follow certain formal axiological laws. Formal axiology should allow us to determine an objective ranking among values of the same domain. It also provides a basis for practical decisions since the greatest value is the one that we should realize in our actions. Prompted by Geiger’s (1907/09) criticism of his early ethics, Husserl stressed the limits of his former approach on ethics in his later years. Geiger brought up the example of a loving mother that would never need to deliberate whether supporting her child would be the best thing in her practical sphere. Instead the loving parent knows in her heart that this is the case. Following this line, the later Husserl distinguishes between two different kinds of values: objective values that are axiologically determinable in their rank, and “individual, subjective values of love” that originate from a person’s innermost center. The latter are also subjective insofar as they are not necessarily shared by every member of a community. Nevertheless, in a situation of choice these subjective values override the objective values and determine what is morally demanded by the loving persons. This paper (i) presents Husserl’s self-critical remarks against his early formal ethics and (ii) investigates the impact of values of love on the validity of his formal axiology. Finally, I will (iii) argue that the rational laws of his formal axiology remain valid even within an ethics of love.

Axiology as First and Last Philosophy: Instinct, Value, and God in the Later Husserl

William Tullius (Gonzaga University)

Husserl, in his 1920/24 lectures on ethics, defines axiology as the distinctive regional ontology concerned with value classification. Here, axiology plays a subordinate and propaedeutic role relative to ethical position-taking. However, this paper argues that axiology comes to serve not only as a mere regional ontology and propaedeutic to ethical science, but also as a foundational discipline for all transcendental, phenomenological descriptive and reconstructive science. This becomes particularly evident where Husserl’s inquiry into the theory of instinct places value at the very heart of transcendental constitution. Instinctual passivities are, for Husserl, primordial habitualities regulating the development of the ego and of everything connected with it in its constituting role vis-à-vis the world. Moreover, instinct is already a constitution of the primordial and instinctive value and disvalue from out of which the object-world is formed. As such, instinct and its correlative values represent an inborn, teleological ground for the streaming, constituting life of transcendental subjectivity, placing value at the very root of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology. Moreover, Husserl goes on to argue that the higher level value of the harmonization of all individual subjective experience of the world, which consists in the idea of God as the ideal goal and entelechy of all subjective and intersubjective life, plays the pivotal role in the constitution of the Objective world. Value, then, provides Husserl with a leading clue at the limits of phenomenological analysis by means of which to embark upon the ultimate (’letzte’) metaphysical, speculative work of conceptualizing divine being.
Session 3A

Experience, Normativity and Values A Phenomenological Approach
Roberta De Monticelli (San Raffaele University, Milan)

The general topic of this paper is value, which I shall provisionally define as the experiential facet of normativity. That there is an experiential facet of normativity, is a main claim of classical phenomenology, which this paper will provide some evidence for. I shall first discuss the state of the art concerning normative properties and the dilemma of normative supervenience (Part 1); we shall then devote ourselves to an exercise of visual and emotional exploration, accompanied by a phenomenological analysis of value(s), allowing us to spell out what seems to be wrong with all the envisaged non-phenomenological competing solutions of the dilemma (Part 2); I shall finally outline a phenomenological way out of the dilemma, thereby showing the path to a full-fledged phenomenological axiology (Part 3).

Phenomenological Metaethics? Some Thoughts on de Montecelli’s Theory of Normativity
Eugene Kelly (New York Institute of Technology)

Not available.
**Session 3B**

**The Fallibility of First-Person Happiness Judgments: A Phenomenological Investigation**  
*George Heffernan (Merrimack College)*

The problem of whether we can be mistaken about our own happiness is as vexed as the question about happiness itself. In *The Nature and Value of Happiness* (2014), Christine Vitrano define happiness as “life-satisfaction” and contends that it is absurd to say that people can be wrong when they state or think that they are happy. Thus she defends an *incorrigible-infallible-first-person-life-satisfaction view of happiness*, claiming that there are no objective criteria for distinguishing between correct and incorrect value judgments about the highest good, and that all attempts to argue otherwise, for example, by appealing to normative conceptions, others’ value judgments, or philosophical concepts of happiness, must fail. In this paper, I argue that Vitrano’s position is indefensible. I adduce three chief pieces of evidence for my position. First, I argue that Vitrano overlooks the ancient analogy between happiness and health. Second, I argue that Vitrano’s position cannot account for serious cases of chronic deception and self-deception. Third, I argue that, as there are cases in which we can correct ourselves on our own happiness and misery, so there are also cases in which others can correct us, and even cases in which they can do this better than we ourselves can, as well as vice versa. I conclude that the position that our perceptions of and judgments about our own happiness and misery are infallible, or incorrigible by others, including philosophers, is untenable. To support my arguments, I apply select insights of Husserl’s phenomenological ethics as expressed in *Husserliana* XXVIII, XXXVII, and XLII.

**Moritz Geiger and the Cheerfulness of the Colour Yellow. For a Phenomenological Hypothesis on the Origin of Values**  
*Anna Donise (Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II)*

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Germany hosted a heated debate among art historians, psychologists, philosophers and aestheticians about the definition to be given to the experiences that accompany the perception of a particular landscape, a colour or a melody. Some argued that the happiness or sadness that a colour transmits should be classified as an empathetic experience, to be exact, as “a mood of empathy towards the non-human.” Through phenomenological analysis, with particular reference to Moritz Geiger, my talk: (1) investigates in what sense we can speak of “empathy” about a “cheerful landscape”, or when what is “cheerful” is a colour, such as yellow. I will distinguish between empathy for another human subject, and the empathy we feel for something sub-human; (2) articulates a phenomenological analysis of the experience of consciousness of the “cheerfulness of yellow,” separating the “subjective” side from the “objective” one; and (3) finally, it proves that objects have characters that bridge the gap between the most diverse spheres of sense; for instance, we say that colour are hot or cold even if they do not have a temperature. In conclusion, it will argue that the meaning of these characters or qualities is not an intentional attribution of sense (*Sinngebung*), but rather something that is independent of the states of an individual at a given time, and therefore potentially has universal validity; this validity allows to outline some hypothesis about the genesis of values and opens a very fertile field of investigation for ethics.
Scheler’s ethics is linked with his reassessment of material values and his critique of post-Kantian formalism concerning the apriori and foundational arguments in ethics. His phenomenological approach to the stratification of emotional life and to the order of values is based on his reception of Husserl’s Logical Investigations. However, few scholars have pointed out that Scheler’s leading intuition relies on his application of Husserl’s concept of foundation in the realm of ethics. My aim is to expound on Scheler’s formal axiological distinction between things, goods and values against the background of Husserl’s Third Investigation, where Husserl formalized the phenomenological concept of foundation as an integral part of his theory of wholes and parts. Following De Monticelli (2015), I will claim that Scheler applies Husserl’s concept of unitary foundation to describe how values inhere goods. I will compare Scheler’s formal-ontologically driven axiology with Hare’s (1952) claim that if two persons are indiscernible with respect to natural properties, they are necessarily indiscernible with respect to moral goodness. Nonetheless, moral goodness is not entailed by the natural properties through which these persons and their actions can be described: it supervenes on natural properties. On the contrary Scheler argues that, “in a world of the same qualities[,] things could be quite different from what they are, and yet the world of goods could remain the same. In any area of goods the natural thing-world can never be determining or even restricting in the formation of goods. The world is originaliter as much a ‘good’ as a ‘thing’.”. Finally, I will address the paramount role that such a formalization of Scheler’s material ethics can play in understanding his last metaphysical insights that «omne ens est aestimativum» (GW XI, 59) and «ens a se est summum aestimativum» (GW XI, 60; 242), i.e. every being (and therefore the highest being, too) is necessarily valuable, but neither necessarily a good nor necessarily good.
Session 4B

The Axiological Turn in Ingarden’s Aesthetics

Gabriel Marko (Charles University Prague)

Roman Ingarden was one of the pioneers and most influential proponents of phenomenological aesthetics, a discipline that he actively developed for almost forty years. In this presentation, I argue that there was a fundamental change in Ingarden’s aesthetic, which I call the axiological turn, and show its impact on his aesthetics. There are two main indicators of this turn: 1) the shift in focus from the purely intentional object to aesthetic experience as the central concept of aesthetics and 2) the formation of his aesthetics, independent of the ontology of work of art, based on this shift. The period of this change is framed by the formation of Literary Work of Art (LWA) in 1927/28 and the publishing of The Cognition of Literary Work of Art (CLW) in 1937. My main argument is based on contrasting Ingarden’s ideas in these two books and by clarifying the historical circumstances of the formation of LWA. Ingarden meant this book to be a preparation for discussion of the idealism-realism problem. This ontological motivation shaped his ideas, including the often-quoted stratified structure of literary artwork. At the same time, he realised the limitations of this approach to aesthetics that he later overcame by introducing the concept of aesthetic experience in CLW. This allowed Ingarden to broaden the scope of aesthetics and to make it an independent discipline.

Franz Brentano and G. E. Moore on the Objectivity of Moral Judgments

Biagio Tassone (Independent scholar)

The importance and influence of G. E. Moore’s contributions to modern metaethics are frequently cited but without clear consensus on the exact significance of his influence. Moore, of course, is well known for introducing the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ and the ‘open question argument’ and using them to criticize earlier definitions of the good in philosophical ethics. Amongst these earlier definitions, to which the naturalistic fallacy is supposed to apply, is the theory of the good as a correct judgment of love developed by Franz Brentano. In my paper I will show how Moore misunderstands Brentano’s theory of conceptual analysis and, by extension, Brentano’s explanation of how the concept of the good plays a central role as both the norm in making moral judgments and as a motivating factor in ethical conduct. Although Moore claims that he is attempting to formulate a theory very similar to Brentano’s, in reality he attributes to the latter a fallacious conception of definition in the process distorting Brentano’s quite original combination of virtue ethics and utilitarianism. In my paper I argue that a comparison of Moore’s position with that of Brentano’s enables an insightful exploration of the tensions present in Moore’s ethics. A correct reading of Brentano’s philosophical ethics, I will maintain, can subsequently help us to clarify the value of Moore’s analysis of the good in relation to later developments in ethics.
Session 5A

Difference and Responsibility: The Role of Alteriority in Authenticity and Identity

Ryan Adams (Franciscan University of Steubenville)

There would seem to be no stronger argument in favor of the real identity of a person, that is, a subjective existent which persists through time, than the notion of moral responsibility. Thus, I will set out to discuss the intrinsic, or at least very clear, connection between responsibility and difference (or the Otherness of the Other) on the one hand, and the self-identity of the self on the other. For this purpose, I will address the notion of personal essence within the works of the early German phenomenologists Max Scheler and Edith Stein. Their ideas on the personal essence, as the core of identity, will be subjected to the critical analysis of three later phenomenologists: Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida. Through this, I will attempt to critically appraise the idea of the personal essence, and give an account for the way in which the world, others, and even our relation to ourselves gives us the formulation of what we might feel secure calling an identity, or self.

Phenomenological Social Theory as a Foundation of Sociology. The Alternative of Max Scheler and Alfred Schütz

Joachim Fischer (Technische Universität Dresden)

This paper compares the paradigms of social theory presented in Max Scheler’s *The Nature of Sympathy* (1913/1923) and Alfred Schütz’ *The Phenomenology of the Social World* (1932). While in the 1920s Scheler became a rising star in both sociology and philosophy of intersubjectivity – which is documented by the reception of other contemporary thinkers like Theodor Litt, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Karl Löwith – Schütz was the one to have a lasting impact on sociology. Schütz is nowadays considered a classical figure in sociology, whereas Scheler is not. In this paper, I will try to explain the background conditions that led to the fates of these two fruitful approaches of social theory by explaining the theoretical relationship between both. The essential difference is that Schütz’ theory of intersubjectivity is rooted in the rational dimension (referring to Max Weber) – the other is given in the medium of “meaning” (*Sinn*) –, while Scheler’s social theory is founded in the emotional dimension – the others as others are given in emotive experience, especially in sympathy or in shame. In a countermove to the real history of philosophical based sociology in the 20th century, I will consider what advantages sociology could have gotten (or still can get) if it were to have (or came to take) Scheler’s theory of the primordiality of the other in emotive experience into consideration. What benefit would there be in having Scheler instead of Schütz as a classical figure in sociology?
Session 5B

Value Theory, Austrian Economics, and an Ethics for our Time

Dennis Skocz (Independent scholar)

A current of thought runs from Brentano through Husserl and others to Menger, the intellectual grandfather of Austrian or neo-classical economics – one that addresses the nature of value. The late 19th – early 20th debate I reference ties ethics and economics together and unfolds within a rich multi-disciplinary intellectual milieu that has its epicenter in Vienna and extends to universities across Germany and the Austro-Hungarian empire. My questions focus on the subjectivity of value as affirmed by key figures in the debate and by Menger’s successors in economics: (a) How subjective were the accounts of value given by Brentano, Ehrenfels, and others? And, what did “subjective” mean in this context anyway? (b) Might Husserlian phenomenology offer the means for crediting both subjective and objective dimensions of value? My own answer is “yes” and I hope to explain why, deploying the concepts of intentionality, grounded and grounding acts of consciousness, and motivated choice (meaning fulfillment as “conflict resolution”). (c) Menger and others in the debate had interests in both economics and philosophy. The question that looms over their work is: Can economics serve as a unified and positive science of value (covering ethics, sociology, cultural anthropology, etc.) or would economics, so conceived, undermine any rigorous ethics that would make non-negotiable demands on the ethical subject? What may be gleaned from the value-theory debate and early phenomenology of relevance to this imposing and overarching question?

The Ubiquity of Values: Drummond beyond Husserl, Husserl beyond Drummond

Thomas Byrne (KU Leuven)

In his Logische Untersuchungen, Edmund Husserl explains that axiological experiences consist of two moments; “feeling-sensations” and “feeling-intentions”. These are so termed because he interprets these experiences through the lens of his schema of sensations and apprehension. In the first section of this paper, I examine how John Drummond rectifies these tenets of Husserl’s thought by asserting that sensorial content is inaccessible to phenomenological inquiry. The core claim of Drummond’s theory, which utilizes these notions, is that values are the correlates of feeling-intentions, which are motivated by feeling-sensations, i.e., bodily-feelings. It is my thesis that there is another kind of value-constitution that is not examined in Drummond’s work. It is not a philosopher external to the phenomenological tradition who first discovered these intentions, but rather the thinker who inspired Drummond’s work. That is, it is Husserl who, in the forthcoming Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins, introduces “empty bodily-feelings” and “empty feeling-intentions”. To expost these intentions, I investigate the everyday example where I perceive a cup of coffee. Husserl would here claim that I emptily present the possibility of drinking the coffee and that I also execute the empty bodily-feeling of pleasure that would result from this drinking, which can motivate the empty feeling-intention that emptily positively values that drinking-possibility. With this conclusion, Husserl is able to maintain, in line with Drummond, that value-attributes are the correlates of feelings. At the same time, he has introduced the novel idea that intuitive bodily feelings are not required for valuations.
Session 6A

Phenomenological Film Theory and Max Scheler’s Material Aesthetics of Values
Matthew Rukgaber (Eastern Connecticut State University)

Max Scheler’s value realism has had no influence on phenomenological aesthetics. This essay remedies that by exploring the basic contours of his phenomenology, theory of value feeling, metaphysics of values and their objective, a priori hierarchy, and aesthetics via application to the study of film. Scheler’s phenomenological theory of the content of film and our experience of it through feeling is contrasted to a variety of opposing views, including standard phenomenological aesthetics. The upshot is that Scheler provides us with a theory of how film provides us with the experience of human values and other minds. It also provides us with a complicated set of value distinctions by which we can analyze the orders of love and hate within a film.

Roman Ingarden’s Concept of Ideal Meaning and the Concretization of Aesthetic Objects
Robert Luzecky (Indiana University–Purdue University Fort Wayne)

One of Ingarden’s most vexing claims is that the meanings of the words in a literary text are entities that exist outside the temporal continuum. I elaborate on the claim that an element of the meaning of words (and, by extension, higher linguistic formations – i.e., sentential structures) is not extended over any period of the history of the real world, despite the fact that literary works may be read at any time (after their creation) and enjoy a form of intentional life. In the final section, I elaborate on Ingarden’s concept that the literary work of art enjoys an intentional existence as an aesthetic object. Neither reducible to material being nor ideal being, the literary work of art is a type of organic being that enjoys an intentional existence as an aesthetic object. The suggestion here is that words have the same metaphysical status as the ideal elements of the sounding elements of musical works, in the sense that they enjoy a sort of being that is not dependent on any sort of spatio-temporal location. In order to clarify why the meanings of words (conceived of as sounding entities which have the strange property of having many meanings but which retain their identity of meaning) are not simply socially determined, I turn to Ingarden’s identification of the musical work to unpack the quite complex (and very limited) analogy that exists among musical works of art and literary works of art.
Session 6B

On States of Affairs and Judgments: Daubert, Reinach and The Great Schism of Early Phenomenology

Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray (King’s University College)

Johannes Daubert and Adolf Reinach were considered leaders in the Munich Phenomenology group; both men were extremely inspired by Edmund Husserl on all things relating to states of affairs and judgments, along with other speech acts like questions and subjectless sentences, truth and meaning. However, Daubert and Reinach were also critical of Husserl’s ideas on these matters: they and other students had misgivings about §§ 69 and 70 of the Sixth Investigation, specifically with the distinctions Husserl had drawn between statements expressing judgment, wishing, questioning, and commanding, and how these different types of grammatical constructions come to have meaning. Thus, a most intense and beneficial debate arose that lasted from roughly 1905 right through to the end of Göttingen phenomenology with the outbreak of WWI. This debate over the nature of these entities predicts, frames and explains much of the Great Schism: the theoretical and philosophical differences held by the Munich Phenomenologists, inherent in their realism and maintained independence from both Husserl and Lipps, come alive in the debate about the ontological status, nature, variety and structures that are involved when any act of judgment obtains (or does not obtain) the state of affairs that is the objective truth-maker. This paper will describe and discuss Reinach and Daubert’s work (and lightly touch on Husserl’s) on states of affairs and the nature of judgment, and demonstrate how it predicted and lead to the Great Schism in early phenomenology.

Edith Stein’s Analysis of Beauty in Finite and Eternal Being

Mark Roberts (Franciscan University of Steubenville)

In Finite and Eternal Being Edith Stein’s main analysis of beauty occurs in her consideration of artistic truth and beauty as a transcendental property of being. The following paper is a critical investigation of several positions she takes on the nature of beauty in this book. In particular, I shall argue that her presentation of artistic truth is in conflict with her acceptance of the traditional Aristotelian and Thomistic position of beauty as a transcendental property of being. Under this traditional view beauty is thought to be identical to the good with merely a conceptual difference between them. Furthermore, they are said to be convertible with real being which is understood to be encompassed by the Categories. However, in her discussion of works of art Stein speaks of their form apparently without realizing that artifacts have traditionally been thought to fall outside of the categories and therefore to lack a form. She also speaks of their unity, a transcendental property again traditionally limited to the being of the categories and not artifacts. This also points to the difficulty of identifying beauty with good since good has been thought to be convertible with the being of the categories, but beauty is attributable to artifacts that fall outside the categories. In this paper I will explain and develop these and related points in greater detail and will argue for a position on beauty and works of art that is a radical revision of the traditional metaphysics of the art and the categories along phenomenological lines.
Religious Consciousness: Battleground between Authentic Religion and Value Delusion

Cristopher Fajardo (Oxford University)

Without neglecting the invaluable contributions of Scheler’s phenomenology of religious consciousness, this essay scrutinizes its limitations, which are largely due to self-imposed constraints of the incipient Husserlian phenomenology to which Scheler adheres. I shall argue that in its attempt to criticize the Kantian categories and formalism, the new imperative of zu den Sachen selbts consequently favored the subjective correlate of the phenomenological act, and may have rendered its objective correlate opaque and exposed to instrumentalization. This tendency, which is traceable both in Scheler’s phenomenology of religious acts and in his non-formal ethics of values, upholds the autocratic tribunal of the ego when it comes to recognition of values, not excepting even the highest value—das Heilige. In this light, the contemporary menace of radicalization of religions can be viewed as corruption of religious consciousness, or the instrumentalization of religious consciousness for deluded values. It therefore becomes increasingly imperative to revisit the discussion of religious consciousness, and to see beyond the opacity of that which gives itself in this unique phenomenological act. The theologies of Karl Rahner and Karl Barth on faith and revelation, as well as Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of icon and idol, will be considered as approaches that may regard the objective correlate of the phenomenological act in its givenness, which includes the recognition of its irreducible otherness, excess and gratuity.
This paper investigates Husserl’s concept of community, emphasizing the contributions of practical intentionality to personal associations. Acknowledging that consciousness is partially shaped by interests, and that consciousness of membership is motivated by practical acts, I argue that trust is a fundamental political interest blurring the line between the evaluative and the practical. Phenomenological analysis of the practical intentionality of political trust will be crucial, then, toward a Husserlian-inspired account of political reality. Husserl claims that a community is a “personality of a higher order” (PHO), that is, a higher-order subject arising from the willing of members, yet possessing a distinct communal will that is more than the sum of its parts. Some commentators associate Husserl’s PHO with communities sharing a deliberate will and others associate PHO only with the formation of a sense of intersubjective commonness. The practical intentionality literature suggests practice is either founded on valuing, or that all forms of intentionality are in some sense practical. I argue that PHO applies both to deliberately cooperative communities as well as less organized yet still functional communities. In the latter case, I claim that communal bonds constituting a PHO are capable of being held through political trust even amidst disagreement between individual members. Furthermore, practices exhibiting political trust provide intentional foundations for certain evaluative acts.

Inner Joining: A feeling of togetherness as the foundation of a social community. Gerda Walther’s analysis of the ontology of social communities

At the beginning of the 20th century realistic phenomenology examines topics such as emotions, feelings and sociality. Gerda Walther’s contribution to realistic phenomenology was her Ph.D. dissertation Ein Beitrag zur Ontologie der sozialen Gemeinschaften (“A contribution to the ontology of social communities”) which she published in 1922 under the supervision of the Munich phenomenologist Alexander Pfänder. In her dissertation Walther analyzes essential characteristics of social communities. Furthermore, she wants to demonstrate how individuals are connected within a social community. Walther argues that the concept of inner joining (innere Einigung) is the essential characteristic of a social community. It is a feeling of togetherness that constitutes a social community. The intention of this presentation is to pursue two aims: The first aim is to examine Walther’s concept of inner joining which forms the basis of social communities. To provide a better understanding of the concept of inner joining, two levels of communities will be discussed in this paper. The second aim is to show that Walther combines her concept of inner joining with Edith Stein’s notion of empathy to develop we-experiences (Gemeinschaftserlebnisse). Thus, this presentation illustrates that Walther expands Stein’s theory of empathy. This assumption is based on Walther’s structural analysis of we-experiences.
Session 8A

Ontological Axiology in Nikolai Lossky, Max Scheler, and Nicolai Hartmann

Frederic Tremblay (Saint-Petersburg State University)

The Russian philosopher Nikolai Lossky — whom Joseph Dieška called “the greatest living metaphysician of our century” — developed an ontological axiology according to which values exist independently of whether they are experienced or known by a human subject. I have argued elsewhere that Lossky and his ex-student Nicolai Hartmann shared many metaphysical and epistemological views, and that Lossky influenced Hartmann in adopting several of them. But, in the case of axiological issues, it appears that it was rather Lossky who borrowed from Hartmann. When developing his ontological theory of values in *Freedom of Will* (Свобода воли, 1927), *Value and Being* (Ценность и бытие, 1931), and *Conditions of the Absolute Good* (Условия абсолютного добра, 1949), Lossky took Hartmann and the latter’s Göttingen colleague Max Scheler as his interlocutors and found support for his views in their phenomenology-inspired axiologies to develop his own. In this paper, I examine the relationship — influences, borrowings, and criticisms — between Lossky’s axiology and those of Scheler as developed in *Der Formalismus in der Ethik* (1916) and Hartmann in *Ethik* (1926) on four main interwoven issues: (1) their ontological realism with regards to the reality of values, (2) their epistemological theories of the intuition of moral values, (3) their ontological definitions of “value” (whether values are relations, qualities, essences, meanings, etc.), and (4) their theories of the stratification of values.

The Moral Significance of Imaginative Recreation: A critical view of Scheler’s Rejection of Projectionism

Olivia Bailey (Harvard University)

In *The Nature of Sympathy*, Max Scheler takes aim at a venerable pair of theses whose origin he locates in “the psychology and ethics of the French Enlightenment.” The first, call it “epistemic projectivism,” holds that understanding of another’s mind can only be achieved by conjuring up copies of the other’s attitudes in oneself. The second, call it “care projectivism,” holds that care for others must be a “consequence or counterpart” of self-directed care. As Scheler points out, this latter thesis has historically been used to underpin the broader claim that the recreation of others’ feelings in ourselves is a morally significant phenomenon, on the grounds that care for others must be a cornerstone of our ethical lives. Ultimately, Scheler opposes not only the aforementioned projectivist theses but also the attribution of any positive moral significance to the recreation of others’ feelings. In this paper I focus on Scheler’s discussion of epistemic projectivism. I argue that while some of his criticism of this thesis hits its target, he neglects to acknowledge that the imaginative, affectively engaged recreation of others’ points of view is the unique source of a particular kind of understanding of others. I further suggest that attention to the perspective of those who seek the empathy of others reveals that being understood in this way is something we value for its own sake. That fact about what we value in turn provides good reason to think, *contra* Scheler, that our ability to recreate others’ affective attitudes matters morally.
Session 8B

**Emotion as Lived Value in Kolnai and Sartre**  
Daniel O’Shiel (KU Leuven)

This paper starts from the idea that a pure axiology is not only misguided, but also superfluous. I will use Sartre and Kolnai to show that it is in *emotion* where we live out our values most immediately and forcefully. First I will explicate Sartre’s neglected theory of value in order to show that values ‘as such’ are at best trivial truisms, at worst cognitive ghosts. Secondly I will show that Kolnai’s 1929 essay on disgust ultimately provides us with a detailed analysis of the essential *dynamic* that is constantly at work between our emotions and values. Finally, Sartre’s theory of emotion will show how emotive consciousness ‘magically’ (i.e. non-deterministically) transforms the world by assigning emotive qualities to objects (e.g. a ‘stupid’ computer) that do not originally belong to such objects, but that constantly live out our values (and ‘antivalues’) in one way or another. Such analyses will allow me to show that both Kolnai and Sartre ultimately contrast two metaphysical or ontological realms: for Kolnai an unordered, excessive realm over against a more balanced, ordered one; and for Sartre a brute, valueless realm over against a striving, conscious one. Joyous emotions result when there exists resonance between the two realms; here our values are aligned with—or even overflow—the given state of affairs. Unpleasant emotions, on the other hand, result when there is dissonance between the two realms. I will end by questioning how much control we may or may not have over such apparent (dis)harmonies.

**The Unity of Disgust and its Existential Significance: A closer look at Aurel Kolnai’s essay Disgust**  
Tomas Šinkūnas (KU Leuven)

Recent developments in psychology, neurosciences have yielded many important findings to the study of emotions. In spite of these discoveries, modern scholars still struggle to coherently account for the unique structure of disgust or determine its real significance. In difference to much of the contemporary literature on disgust I aim to show that through employing the phenomenological method in his 1929 essay *Disgust* Aurel Kolnai was able to denote the real significance of disgust as well as account for a conceptually coherent structure. The current study aims to present a structurally coherent view of disgust with a conceptual basis that enables a differentiation between disgust and other emotions such as fear, by emphasizing the former as a defense reaction against a disturbing object that highlights subject’s susceptibility to decay and decomposition. In order to achieve this goal, I will present Kolnai’s notion of disgust by first focusing on its visceral sense: the essential features of the intentional content of disgust, the common features of a disgusting object and their relation. Then, I will analyze and present the life-death complex as the underlying structure of the visceral sense of disgust. Lastly, I will show how the life-death complex relates to the visceral sense of disgust, thereby denoting its real significance. Overall, this study will contribute towards a better understanding of Kolnai’s *Disgust* and will serve as plausible alternative to the current interpretations of disgust.
Session 9A

Scheler’s New Middle Ages: Phenomenology and Catholicism in the 1920s
Edward Baring (Drew University)

In his 1923 lectures to the German Catholic *Akademikerverband*, Erich Przywara identified Scheler’s phenomenology as a major force in the religious and social renewal of Germany. In my paper, I examine Scheler’s reception amongst Catholics in the 1910s and 1920s to explain why it was invested with such significance. During the War, Scheler gained prominence through his engagement with the leading Catholic literary journal in Germany, *Hochland*. In the years following defeat, he informed *Hochland*’s political and social vision: a Christian social democracy. To realize this vision *Hochland* invested its hopes in the large and vibrant Catholic Youth movement, especially its “Quickborn” form. But many worried that the Youth movement’s Catholicism was built on unsure foundations. Here, Scheler played a decisive role. Widely read by members of Quickborn, many Catholics saw him as a salutary influence. Paul-Ludwig Landsberg, for instance, hoped that Scheler’s phenomenology could guide the “anarchic” drives of the youth towards the “order” necessary for social renewal. Others like Przywara, however, thought that Scheler’s philosophy suffered from the same errors as the Youth movement it was meant to guide. The debate centered on the appropriate Catholic response to modernity and informed the first responses to Scheler’s criticism of the Catholic Church after 1923.

The War of Values. Scheler’s War Writings in the Context of German Kriegsphilosophie
Christian Sternad (KU Leuven)

The First World War witnessed an unparalleled engagement of philosophers for or against the war effort. German philosophers in particular developed a unique discourse which then became known as the “Ideas of 1914”. Max Scheler’s war writings can be seen as part of this movement, which Kurt Flasch designated as “spiritual mobilization”. The idea behind this designation is that the historical-political warfare is accompanied by a spiritual warfare fought with pen and paper. In this war, the clash of nations is seen as a clash of cultures, i.e. a war of values represented by the belligerent nations. *Der Genius des Krieges und der Deutsche Krieg* (1915) is one of the most important and also one of the philosophically richest texts of this movement. The uncomfortable fact, however, is that Scheler’s war writings cannot be seen as separated from his philosophy of values. On the contrary, the full momentum of these writings is gained through his *Der Formalismus in der Ethik* (1913/1916) which delivered the theoretical background for his argumentation in the war writings. In this talk, I will try to connect the war writings with Scheler’s philosophy of values (especially his hierarchy of values) and show how Scheler should be situated in the broader context of the German war philosophy.
Session 9B

The Priority of the Lower: Axiological and Ontological Relations in Nicolai Hartmann’s Value Theory
Keith Peterson (Colby College)

In addition to meta-ethical questions, phenomenologically grounded value theory has also considered questions more directly relevant for normative ethical theory, including the vexing one of a value rank order. Nicolai Hartmann produced one of the most fully developed and underappreciated pluralistic value theories in the history of western philosophy, and it more broadly deals with both normative and meta-ethical issues. According to Hartmann, values are plural and often conflicting, and our task is to resolve these conflicts as best we can. This requires an account of the value domain for the purpose of rank ordering values with the assumption that the value ranking will provide some guidance for settling felt conflicts of values in everyday situations. Although inspired by Scheler’s Formalism (1916), Hartmann’s theory differs markedly in its discussion of the multi-dimensionality of the value scale. Hartmann claims that an independent dimension of strength—in addition to Scheler’s vertical dimension of value height—should be used to characterize value relations. Accepting Scheler’s distinction between values intended and values of the intention, Hartmann distinguished between “goods values” and moral values and described the relations of axiological and ontological dependence between them, which help to characterize the two scalar dimensions of height and strength. This paper will focus on Hartmann’s conception of the axiological and ontological relations between value kinds and will argue that his unique treatment of these relations shows us why the prioritization of the “lower” values in social-ethical life must accompany, if not precede, the prioritization of the higher.

Towards a Realist Phenomenology of Values
Natalia Danilkina (University of Groningen)

In this paper I argue that the conceptions of value ontology suggested by Nicolai Hartmann and Roman Ingarden are compatible. This allows us to consider them as contributors to a certain kind of inquiry – the realist phenomenology of values. Hartmann is a follower of Max Scheler in his argument against neo-Kantian formalization of values. Values, he claims, are independently existing entities, having their own content and characterized by a specific ideal mode of being. They relate to objects of reality. While in the beginning, Ingarden does not seem to hold a Schelerian view, in the end he nevertheless sounds quite Hartmannian. In his late work on the ontic foundations of responsibility he does not reject his previous statement that the being of value is “growing” from the very being of object and their mode of being is the same, but he admits that there is an ideal value entity, which can be studied even when the ontic carrier of the value is destroyed.
Session 10A

Vocation and Identity
Alexander Anderson (Franciscan University of Steubenville)

In his *Formalism in Ethics*, Scheler takes aim at the universality of the moral theory of Immanuel Kant. Against Kant’s assertion that moral sources must be “universal and necessary,” Scheler posits the existence of individual value-essences which carry with them their own oughts. Scheler does not deny the existence of universal oughts or universal values, but rather seeks to add to the fabric of values those which are based upon the individual essence. In many ways, Scheler seeks to counter the ‘leveling’ effect of Kant’s universal ethics, in exchange for a more authentic ethic, an ethic which prizes being true to one’s self. This ethic is given an explicitly metaphysical foundation in Scheler’ system. All persons have an individual value-essence, and this is the source of moral oughts which are particular to each person. Chief of these is Scheler’s idea of an individual “call” or vocation, which is found by an encounter with this individual value-essence as its moral source. The source of vocation is interior to the individual, and it must be discovered by him. For Scheler, a primary mode for this process of discovery is love. The emphasis on love and on interiority are two things that tie Scheler’s personalist ethics here to what Charles Taylor calls “the ethic of authenticity.” The ties to this ethic and their historical basis are the topic of this essay. I will pose as a question whether the moral source of vocation is truly the individual, or whether it is the sort of thing that requires a moral source outside of the self. This will bring us to an examination of the concept of ‘vocation’ or ‘calling’ itself.

Session 10B

Practical intentionality and Gefühlsintentionalität
Susi Ferrarello (University of San Francisco)

This paper will focus on practical intentionality--a term that I believe can positively contribute to phenomenological discourse. I am not going to defend a definition of intentionality that is exclusively cognitive. Instead I will emphasize the genetic and emotional character of intentional acts. Husserl’s exploration of Gemütt (heart) is as important as his analysis of doxische Vernunft (epistemological reason), and that the exploration of practical intentionality contributes to a balanced view of the two. That being said, I do not want to defend either the idea that the Husserl of *Logical Investigations* or *Ideas* would consider practical intentionality as pure intentionality; rather I think that practical intentionality was an early insight of Husserl’s that he deepened only later when he developed his genetic phenomenology--which I consider inseparable from his static phenomenology. Therefore in what follows I will refer primarily to the *Logical Investigations* (1901), *Ideas* (1913), and *Analysis Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis* (1859-1938) in order to describe the evolution of Husserl’s thought in relation to the issue of intentionality. It is my belief that the insight of practical intentions (Hua VIII, 34) was already present in his writings of 1901, but only later, with the introduction of the genetic method, was he able to more fully explicate the meaning of "practical" intentions. Thus, in the first part of the paper I will describe what Husserl means by intentions. In the second part I will consider Husserl’s analysis of intentionality in the *Logical Investigations*, *Ideas* and *Analyses*. Through the examination of this latter, I will explore one specific declension of practical intentionality, namely, affective intentionality.