

Time, Memory, and Eternity

13-15 June 2018. Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA.
Power Center, Charles J. Dougherty Ballroom

Annual conference of the *North American Society for Early Phenomenology* in conjunction
with the *Max Scheler Society of North America*

NASEP
The North American Society
for Early Phenomenology

Keynote Addresses

10:00-11:15, Wednesday, 13 June.

Levels of Time and Memory: Husserl's Later Phenomenology of Inner Time-Consciousness

Lanei Rodemeyer (Duquesne University)

Husserl scholars are well aware that Husserl engages different levels of experience in his phenomenological analyses. In *Ideas I*, for example, he remains fairly focused on the level of objective constitution, where objects are constituted as whole unities. In *Ideas II* and the *Cartesian Meditations*, on the other hand, he moves through several levels in order to arrive at a description of the intersubjective levels. My argument in this article is that there are several of these levels of experience, and that they are much more systematically in place for Husserl than might first appear. My goal, therefore, is to explicate each of these levels as well as to demonstrate how Husserl carries out analyses in each of them. I will do so by first turning to Husserl's Fifth *Cartesian Meditation* as a way to outline the different levels through a text with which many phenomenologists are familiar. I will then turn to Husserl's later "C Manuscripts" in order to work through one of his analyses that demonstrate these levels fairly clearly.

17:30-18:45, Wednesday, 13 June.

Husserl and the First World War

Nicolas De Warren (Pennsylvania State University)

Although Husserl welcomed the outbreak of the First World War and proudly supported the volunteering of his two sons, Husserl's attitude towards the war was marked by a curious ambivalence between public silence as a professor and private expressions of nationalistic sentiment. Unlike his other university colleagues, Husserl refrained from the spiritual mobilization of his philosophical thinking, even as he admired the war-time writings of Natorp and his student Mahnke. It is only, however, towards the end of the war, in 1917 and two weeks before the end of the war in 1918, that Husserl delivers a public set of lectures, *Fichte's Ideal of Humanity*, in which he speaks to and in support of the war from his position as an university professor and, more significantly, from the perspective of his phenomenological philosophy. Husserl comes to the war philosophically when the war was philosophically already lost. How can we reconciled these various ambiguities in Husserl's attitude and response to the First World War? How did the First World War affect, both personally and philosophically, Husserl?

14:00-15:15, Thursday, 14 June.

„Ich [bin] ebensowohl weniger als mehr »Pazifist«“. („I am both more and less than a „pacifist.“ Max Scheler zu Krieg und Friede

Michael Gabel (Universität Erfurt)

The experience of Great War awakens the idea of perpetual peace. This idea accompanies the history of humanity. Especially since the 19th century, this idea of perpetual peace appears under the concept of pacifism. The question I explore is whether perpetual peace can be brought about by strong rulers or by the people constituted in a republican and democratic manner. I further examine whether perpetual peace is obtained through the renunciation of violence and war or through the readiness for war. This question concerns pacifism as well as the peace movement. Max Scheler was concerned with this question since the beginning of the Great War and in the years during the Weimar Republic. Fundamentally, he holds that perpetual peace is possible. Perpetual peace is the distant aim of the politics and culture of all cultures, peoples, nations and religions. As a theologian, I contend that eternal peace is the eschatological aim of humanity. Especially for this reason, peace is not achieved through forceful means. Yet, it must be sought in all situations. An additional question concerns the means by which perpetual peace can be achieved. Scheler does not believe that total disarmament is a means to peace. With the concept, „character militarism,“ he develops an idea of using the army and weapons in such a way that the responsibility for humanity and standing up for it are the highest goals. As a counter idea, he proposes the concept of „instrumental militarism,“ where the use of the army and weapons are subordinated to a different purpose, i.e., a purpose where the human being is only treated as a means. However, Scheler sees this danger also in the different historical manifestations of pacifism. Pacifism can aim at being of service to humanity, but it can also be subordinated to particular interests.

14:00-15:15, Friday, 15 June.

Temporal Topologies in Husserl and Brentano

Carlo Ierna (University of Groningen)

In my presentation I will focus on the various ways in which Husserl and Brentano use spatial terminologies to describe the structure of time-consciousness. Not only in their time-diagrams, but also in their formal treatment of the temporal continuum Brentano and Husserl use spatial metaphors to clarify their position. It is well known that Husserl criticised Brentano's discussion of time in his lectures *On the Phenomenology of Consciousness of Internal Time*, as well as the fact that his criticism is problematic in some respects. While Husserl mentions Brentano's lectures and short written reports of their contents by Stumpf and Marty (Hua X, 4), he glosses over Stumpf's own lectures on the topic, which he likewise attended. We take Stumpf's lectures as representing Brentano's position in this period (his "old" time theory, up until 1894), but adding many illuminating details. By using Stumpf's lectures on *Psychology* (Q11/II) and various manuscripts of Brentano we can further clarify the concepts and terminology that first influenced Husserl and then formed the basis for his critique and elaboration. It is clear that already at the time when Husserl attended his lectures, the temporal extension of experience and particularly retention were complex and problematic notions for Brentano that required further elaboration.

Session 1

11:30-13:00, Wednesday 13 June.

Phenomenology: Schelerian Lessons for a Critical Phenomenology

Eric Mohr (Saint Vincent College)

What makes us change our minds? People are likely more persuaded by new experiences than by the introduction of new ideas (unless those ideas are intuited to be consistent and relevant to their own lived experience). If phenomenology (the logos of phenomena) is the linguistic description of what is presented in experience, then a *critical* phenomenology begins with the premise of a fundamental incongruence (or nonidentity) between linguistic and experiential meaning, between logos and phenomena (hence, a “phenomenology”). Scheler’s nonformal (*materiale*) phenomenology suggests that there is a nonconceptual meaning content in experience that is lost at the moment we articulate this experience conceptually. Ideology arises when we lose sight of this incongruence and hold to ideas that are inconsistent with our experience. Critical phenomenology constitutes a critique of concepts on account of phenomenological clarification as well as a critique of an *ideological attitude*: an attitude that prioritizes conceptual meanings over and above, and largely to the point of a blindness to, the meanings in our experience that counteract those conceptual meanings.

The Metaphysics of Personal Individuality According to Edith Stein

John Crosby (Franciscan University of Steubenville)

I begin by identifying the datum of personal individuality that concerns Edith Stein: it is the particular “strength” of individuality that is proper to human persons and is foreign to non-persons. Persons are not mere instances of the human kind, in which case they could replace each other, but have so powerful an individuality as to be unrepeatable, in which case they cannot possibly replace each other. I proceed to unpack and interpret Stein’s metaphysical account of this distinctly personal individuality of a human being. I consider her proposal that each person has, besides the common human essence that we all share, an unrepeatable identity (*Eigenart*) as *this* person. I give particular attention to the deep kinship that her thought here shows with the personalism of Max Scheler. Finally, I provide some historical setting for Stein’s idea: I show (following Charles Taylor) that with this original teaching of hers she participates in and articulates a significant development of human self-understanding that has taken place in the last few hundred years. I conclude that Stein has made a major contribution to what might be called a phenomenological personalism.

Session 2

14:00-15:30, Wednesday 13 June.

The Vicissitudes of Remembering: Husserl's Phenomenology of False Memories

Patrick Eldridge (KU Leuven)

In Husserl's transcendental methodology, empirically correct memories ought to be just as valid as false ones for studying the intentional structure of recollection. Yet in his later philosophy Husserl held that specific elements of repression (*Verdrängung*), 're-touching' (*Übermalung*), and 'filling in' (*Hineinmalen*) were responsible for memory distortions. Husserl understands these as particular intentional syntheses and they are crucial for understanding how we arrive at mistaken beliefs about our own stream of consciousness. If this is the case, then false memories are not subjectively constituted the way true memories are. If false memories involve different intentional components, then they will be experientially different from true ones. If the experience of a false memory is noticeably distinct from the experience of a true memory, then how could one believe in it? To overcome this problem, I argue that these distorting syntheses are just aberrations of processes that constitute all remembrance, both true and false. Remembering is a progressive re-articulation of the fused, retended, unconscious past. It accomplishes this through specific associative and affective syntheses, which operate non-egoically. This passive process of re-explicating what has remained implicit in the unconscious can suffer various vicissitudes when bringing the particular object-to-be-recalled into distinct relief against the hazy past in which it was nestled.

Husserl on the Evolution of Practical Knowledge

Zachary Hugo (Duquesne University)

In this presentation, I aim to contribute to the rather sparse literature on Husserl's genetic phenomenological operative concept of 'development' (*Entwicklung*), and in particular with regard to its phylo- and ontogenetic use. As opposed to the naturalistic-empirical study of factual organismic development, a phenomenological approach aims to fix transcendental norms governing the emergence of eidetic structures of the correlational a priori. In this way, Husserl pretends to show how it is possible that higher-order rational achievements, such as judging and logical reasoning, can emerge from pre-rational, mechanical processes: basic needs, repetition of blind instinctive movements, and habitualization. I argue that Husserl's insights in this regard are highly relevant for contemporary debates on cognitive evolution. Specifically, they offer valuable transcendental clues for responding to a central problem in such debates: How is it possible that goal-directed, norm-abiding acts could develop from non-normative, purely mechanical processes, i.e. 'natural' processes? By drawing from Husserl's extensive though rather fragmentary writings on the birth of teleology and normativity in instinctive perceptual-practical intentionality, I sketch out a Husserlian response to this systematic issue.

Session 3

15:45-17:15, Wednesday 13 June.

Emotion, Axiology, and the Formalist Prejudice: A Schelerian Case for the Affective A Priori

Tanner Hammond (Boston University)

According to a common prejudice in ethical theory, emotional experience cannot ground foundational moral principles unless we are to forfeit an *a priori* foundation for ethics. Underlying this prejudice is the tacit assumption that the domain of *a priori* truth is conterminous with the domain of formal rationality. Upon this view, even if we were to grant world-disclosive intentionality to the affective contents of acts of feeling, the epistemic relevance of such contents would be limited to disclosing those features of reality owing to its contingent natural arrangement. Accordingly, any *a priori* ethical truth disclosed in an act of moral insight must redound only to those propositional and conceptual contents derived from formal reason or practical rationality. In this paper, I aim to make some headway in overcoming this prejudice through an appropriation of Max Scheler's material axiology. According to this account, law-like constraints on true evaluative judgments are grounded in the *a priori* essences of emotional phenomena, which constitute an autonomous regional ontology alongside that of other experiential modalities (e.g. color, tone, space, etc.). In an effort to motivate a broadly Schelerian model of the *material a priori*, I first provide a case study of color incompatibility knowledge, arguing that traditional formal analyses fail to adequately explain the *a priority* of color incompatibility claims. Using the intuition of color essences as an instructive model, I then turn to argue that phenomenological reflection on evaluative phenomena also reveals self-evident objective laws grounded in the nature of emotional experience itself.

"The Naked Fact of Finitude"? Stein's Critique of Heidegger on Temporality, Eternity, and Transcendence

George Heffernan (Merrimack College)

In "Martin Heidegger's Philosophy of Existence" (1937), the Appendix to *Finite and Eternal Being*, Edith Stein criticizes Heidegger's *Existenzphilosophie* as expressed in *Being and Time* (1927) and his other early works. Her critique, inspired by her reading of Augustine and Aquinas, is that Heidegger's approach so overemphasizes the temporal finitude of Dasein that it cannot achieve a "breakthrough" (*Durchbruch*) from finite being to eternal being, that is, it excludes any ontological or spiritual dependence of human being on divine being. Indeed, Stein claims, Heidegger argues without justification that in its finite being Dasein is mortal, confined to this life, and not capable of openness to eternal life and infinite being—that transcendence is impossible. Stein counters that "[the] truth is not the naked fact of one's own existence in its finitude", but rather "the fact of the eternal being that stands behind one's own fragile being" (ESGA 14, 12). From the perspective of a worldview (*Weltanschauung*), of course, one cannot reject Heidegger's analysis or accept Stein's critique. From a philosophical, especially phenomenological, standpoint, however, one must ask whether an unfounded and ungrounded presupposition lies at the basis of *Being and Time*, namely, that for Dasein death is absolutely, hopelessly, and totally final. In this paper, I examine Stein's critique of Heidegger on the finitude of human existence to test whether her main philosophical point about transcendence is valid.

Session 4

9:30-11:00, Thursday 14 June.

The Essence of Deviation: The Phenomenology of Time in the Early Freud

Jeffrey McCurry (Duquesne University)

Phenomenology from close to its beginnings has sought to understand the essence(s) of the experience of temporality, and a central essence of conscious experience for Freud is temporality. It is temporality in which experience is always constituted by divergence from its past and present sedimentations. Freud's psychoanalytic cure in his early work involves the restoration of his patients' full temporally spontaneous flow of experience, no matter how disturbing to their sedimented patterns of experience. The early Freud's therapy is a therapy for welcoming conscious personal experience just as it comes, a therapy meant to restore the neurotic to her or his spontaneous temporal flow of *conscious* experience. The unconscious is, in fact, consciousness unable or unwilling to experience itself spontaneously in time, and psychoanalytic therapy is meant to help consciousness accept its own dynamic temporality and spontaneity. So, while one phenomenological reading of Freud would focus on sexuality as a fundamental essence of all lived experience, the essence of temporality as divergence is also central. Experience's own path is always temporally diverging from its past and present sedimentation, always dynamic not static, always surprising not expected, always becoming not being. So, the experience of psychological health depends upon an ability to welcome this temporality-as-divergence, no matter how difficult or dangerous its deliverances—with the central difficulty and danger the deliverance of divergence itself. The essence of experience's temporality is experience's constant, difficult, dangerous divergence.

On Clinical Interaction. A Schelerian Contribution to Psychoanalytic Clinical Theory

John R. White (Duquesne University)

Max Scheler was perhaps the first major philosopher to deal directly with the new study of the psyche initiated by Freudian psychoanalysis. Even when Scheler was not dealing directly with psychoanalysis, many of his critical concerns overlap with the basic interests of psychoanalytic clinical theory and practice. Psychoanalytic clinical theory hinges on two assumptions: (1) a specific understanding of the psyche and (2) a theory of how two individual psyches interact with each other in clinical sessions. Accordingly, psychoanalysis developed specific concepts to describe the subtle and often obscure elements of clinical interaction. Nonetheless, elements of psychoanalytic clinical theory lack philosophical cogency. In the following paper, I develop some of the necessary presuppositions for a phenomenologically-clarified psychanalytic clinical theory, using Scheler's thought. First, I develop Scheler's notion of the psyche, with an eye to both theoretical clarity and clinical usefulness. Second, I articulate a number of propositions concerning Scheler's understanding of the "knowledge of other minds." Finally, I examine three distinct though related issues in psychoanalytic clinical theory.

Session 5

11:15-12:45, Thursday 14 June.

“Jetzt als reale Herzschlag der Zeit”: The constitution of time by Hedwig Conrad Martius

Manuela Massa (University of Halle)

Because time is considered as “flowing” and “moving forward” according to its transcendental-imaginative function, Hedwig Conrad Martius gives its foundation as the discontinuous progress of the real fundament. Hence, everything regarding the evidence of the human being must be intended according to this constitution, whereby the “now” characterizes the element of this discontinuity defined as “*reale Herzschlag der Zeit*”. For this reason, the aim of my contribution is to analyze the question of the “now” as a limited paradoxical phenomenon across time, in order to determine two extremes for the life of the human being: namely, life and death. All this opens the possibility of a bilateral phenomenology based on these two authentic phenomena of human life.

Time and Becoming: Max Scheler’s Notion of Person as a Contribution to a New Ecological Ethics

Evrin Kutlu (Universität Köln)

Not available.

Session 6A

15:30-17:00, Thursday 14 June. *Power Center

Scheler's Hierarchy of Forms of Human Connectedness. How its Patchy 'Parallel Coordination' with Other Hierarchies Holds Promise for a Theory of Social Processes

Daniel Wolk (University of Chicago)

Taking a philosophical sociology perspective on Scheler's account of the essential forms of human connectedness — mass, life-community, society, and person-community — I argue it contains the seeds of a promising approach to the study of social processes that has never been put into practice. Just as with types of value modalities, human modes of being and acting, emotions in general, subspecies of sympathy, and types of social time, Scheler arranged the forms of human togetherness, or “essential social unities,” into hierarchies. He claimed that all these rank orders fell into a relation of *parallel coordination*. However, a comparison of interpretations of how these essential forms of connectedness, or “sociality” coordinate with the types of sympathy suggests that the parallel coordination is patchy. Assuming a pragmatic stance toward social science, *pace* Scheler, I shift the focus away from his core philosophical hierarchy of value-modalities in favor of his late interest in *modes of participation in being*, in order to deepen understanding of his evolving account of types of sympathy. This makes it possible to show how the coordination between the forms of sociality and types of sympathy is inevitably fuzzy. This sloppy covariance calls attention to an *immanent dynamicism* of social forms, which, like a “motor” of social change, supplies the necessary grounds for the ever-present flux in social life, the particular processes of which it is the job of sociology to account for. Scheler's failure to find tidy parallel coordination turns out to be a feature, not a bug.

Vitality and Values: *Lebensphilosophie* in Nietzsche and Scheler

Jordan Rodgers (King's College)

In this paper, I argue that the difficulty of understanding Nietzsche's use of the concept of “life” as a criterion for evaluating value judgments can be significantly lessened by placing his views alongside those of Max Scheler. Scheler claims that a phenomenological analysis of our emotional life reveals the existence of an order of four “ranks” of values, the second of which is the rank of “vital” values. Though Scheler believes that spiritual values and religious values outrank vital ones, and consequently that Nietzsche's privileging of life as the highest value type is mistaken, his own conception of life is deeply influenced by Nietzsche's, and his views evince a deep appreciation for Nietzsche's philosophical accomplishments. What ultimately separates Nietzsche and Scheler, I argue, is a view about the relationship of life to the activity of valuing. For Nietzsche, values do not exist independently of us, but are created, and this creative power is itself a primary manifestation of life. To suggest that there is something above life is thus to devalue the conditions of the act of valuing itself. For Scheler, values exist independently of us, and are “disclosed” by us in acts of what he calls “love.” Thus, there is nothing “life-denying” in being open to spiritual and religious values; in fact, it is our sensitivity to them that distinguishes us from the other animals.

Session 6B

15:30-17:00, Thursday 14 June. *Phenomenology Center

Eternity and Time in Conrad-Martius' Late Phenomenology

Randy Dible (SUNY Stony Brook)

Conrad-Martius' final period of work grows out of her work on an ultimate philosophical system. Her 1950s trilogy of books—*Die Zeit* (1954), *Das Sein* (1957) and *Der Raum* (1958)—apply her methods to the phenomena of space and time as categories of experience within which phenomena disclose themselves. To make the self-presentation of nature's foundations intelligible in terms of the ontology of reality, Conrad-Martius introduces two categories of space-time called aeonic space-time and apeiric space-time. These categories hang together in her ultimate systematics as a metaphysical project of thematizing the polar constitution of the earthly and heavenly realms. In his analysis of this situation in his 1972 dissertation, *Hedwig Conrad-Martius' Ontological Phenomenology*, James G. Hart offers a phenomenologically informed critique of Conrad-Martius' phenomenology of time. This analysis constitutes the critical moment of Hart's final chapter, "Phenomenology and the Unearthing of Heaven." I will support Hart's critique of Conrad-Martius' phenomenology of time by showing that the Husserlian two-dimensional and double-intentional schema of inner time-consciousness has its roots in the same ancient concepts that Conrad-Martius uses in her philosophy. The themes of the apeiron and of the horizon are as much a dyadic pair in the radical foundations of philosophy as they are in phenomenology, and thereby illustrate her view, and Hart's critique, in a single vision of the phenomenology of space-time.

Total Validity: Edith Stein's Problem of Empathy in the Context of Memory

Joseph Antonello (Franciscan University of Steubenville)

Edith Stein's *The Problem of Empathy* is, at its core, an examination of how our affective responses influence the self as subject, as well as the self in relation with the other. I will focus on the implications of Stein's work for the phenomenology of memory and self-determination, with reference to the work of Husserl and Sartre. It will be my project to show that empathy can affect my experience in memory; that I can take on the situation of the other to the extent that I am no longer simply placing myself in their position but that my empathetic response can become the catalyst for an actual change in my memory. In this, it will be seen that memory's validity remains wholly intact, even where it does not correspond with the historical reality. This is not to say that memory is infallibly true, especially where it does not correspond with facts, but without being confronted by the factual evidence directly, my empathetically altered memory will remain valid and, in a certain sense, real.

Session 7A

17:15-18:45, Thursday 14 June. *Power Center

Revolutionary Feminism and Revolutionary Time in *The Handmaid's Tale*

Robert Luzecky (Purdue University Fort Wayne)

Perhaps the most remarkable claim to emerge from the scholarship on Margaret Atwood's *The Handmaid's Tale* is the suggestion that the novel's protagonist is a broken woman. I challenge this claim through reference to Roman Ingarden's concept of temporality in a novel, and a disagreement between Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir about the nature of *mitsein*. In his analysis of the nature of the literary work of art, Roman Ingarden identifies a novel's temporal moments as "represented objectivities". All represented objectivities are rendered schematically, in the sense that they are awaiting fulfillment by a reader. These temporal moments include all of a character's actions and experiences (i.e., their *mitsein*). Ingarden's account suggests that any character's being with others is part of the ontological process of the novel's actualization – a process that requires the reader's involvement with the text. The reader is every character's other – it is only through the reader's involvement with a text that a character's temporal moments are realized. Jean-Paul Sartre characterizes the other as a hostile entity from which there is no escape. Sartre's account suggests that the reader victimizes the characters of a novel. Simone de Beauvoir characterizes *Mitsein* in more positive terms. *Mitsein* – Beauvoir suggests – enjoys axiological neutrality, in the sense that any normative claim or evaluation is a predicate. For Beauvoir, our relation with others is ambiguous, ontologically so. The identification of *mitsein* as part of the novel's ontology implies that the protagonist in *The Handmaid's Tale* is *not* a victim, in the sense that the character is the reader's contemporary.

A Phenomenology of Literary Time-Consciousness

Charlene Elsby (Purdue University Fort Wayne)

In this paper, I will examine *literary* time consciousness and the *literary* temporal object by combining the relevant insights of early phenomenologists Edmund Husserl on the phenomenology of internal time consciousness (from *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*) and Roman Ingarden on the literary work of art (in *The Literary Work of Art*). I argue that the *nouveau roman* alters our consciousness of an objective time within the world of the book, our conception of temporal *objects* within the book, and ultimately creates a third sort of time that cannot be conceived of as the objective time of either the character or the reader. Literary temporal objects maintain a formal identity with temporal objects of the world, and there is a literary temporal time that we conceive of as analogous to our own time, a literary time in which the events and characters of the novel subsist. In addition, there is within the *nouveau roman* a frenetic, recursive and discontinuous time, where the temporal objects (e.g., the centipede and its demise at the hands of Franck) still appear as temporal unities, but which belongs to the book neither in virtue of its created world nor the world in which it was created.

Session 7B

17:15-18:45, Thursday 14 June. *Phenomenology Center

Non-Temporal Unity as an Answer to the Regress Problem in Husserl's 1905 Lectures on Time-Consciousness

Matthew Wyss (Brock University)

This paper addresses Dan Zahavi's formulation of the regress problem, which he argues results from Husserl's conception of time consciousness. The problem, as Zahavi formulates it, is this: if the perception of duration presupposes the duration of perception, then that perception must be divisible into a succession of now-points. So then there needs to be an explanation for the unity of these now-points. It seems that if we take this perception to be a temporal object itself, presented in introspection, then the act of introspection, too, will be merged in temporal succession—and so would be divisible into a succession of now-points as well. Therefore, there is an explanatory regress. One solution to the regress problem argued for is The Principle of Simultaneous Awareness, which says that a momentary act of consciousness can take a temporally extended object. In this case, the regress would stop wherever in the regress momentariness (in other words, simultaneity) occurs. I argue against this principle. Against this supposed solution, I say that if we can introspect over an act of consciousness, it is apparent that the act is temporally extended. This is true of other acts which we can introspect over, including introspection itself. I argue that the terminal point of the regress is found in a form of consciousness that determines the unity of objects, a unity that is neither simultaneity nor duration—a unity unqualified by temporality. By examining Husserl's text carefully, we can find evidence of an atemporal unifying form of consciousness, which solves the regress problem.

Circularities in Husserl's Bracketing of the Philosophy of Time

Vedran Grahovac (University of Guelph)

I suggest that Husserl develops three types of circularities in his phenomenology of time. The first concerns the confrontation between the objective time flow and its phenomenological articulation in 1905. I propose that the phenomenological re-articulation of time does not unfold beyond or above the objective time flow, dismissing it, but unfolds precisely due to it, or in the face of it: the phenomenological analysis of time, I argue, emphasizes the self-sufficiency of objective time flow. Husserl does not end his analysis with the observation that objective time and its retentional modification diverge (continuity 1), but he suggests that the seeming layering of retentions on the vertical retention-protection axis needs to be rearticulated within the context of the temporal object (continuity 2). Continuity 2 stands as Husserl's resistance to conceive the relations on the line of retentional unfolding as a layering or a mere collection or fusion of retentions. Retentions are being contrasted with each other, revived in their peculiarity, not just repeated in a relation to their succeeding retentions. The mutual self-encircling of retentions fully re-articulates the transitional flow between the time points on the line of the objective time flow. The theme of transition between protentional sequences in the *Bernau Manuscripts* points to a third type of circularity, where the flow on the horizontal line of objective time is articulated as its fragmentation through the sequencing of protentions. The protentions, as they retain previous protentions, articulate the process of temporal transition between protentions into the process of self-enclosure of protentions apropos each other and apropos the now point.

Session 8

9:30-11:00, Friday 15 June.

Member of the Flesh: Max Scheler and Michel Henry on *Empfindungsfehlen*

Justin Leavitt Pearl (Duquesne University)

In the fifth chapter of *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*, Max Scheler undertakes the task of articulating the *sensible feelings* [*Empfindungsgefehlen*], those feelings that are “given as extended and localized in *specific parts* of the lived body.” In 1963, Michel Henry directed a rigorous critique against this account of sensible feelings in §66 of *The Essence of Manifestation*. In the present paper it will be suggested that the debate between Henry and Scheler, inaugurated by *The Essence of Manifestation*, proves fruitful to a contemporary understanding of the lived body (*Leib*) or flesh (*la chair*). By drawing Michel Henry’s concept of auto-affection and critique of extension together with Scheler’s account of “specific parts” or “organs,” it is possible to offer a more thorough account of the manifestation of determinate organs or members within the immanence of the flesh—challenging, on the one hand, Henry’s monadological account of the flesh, and on the other, Scheler’s unjustified recourse to extension.

How Patience Takes Time

Michael Kelly (University of San Diego)

Using resources from Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness and method of eidetic analysis, I explore the intentional and temporal structure of patience. In part one, I try to justify this phenomenological reflection on patience considered as a distinctive intentional stance that entails a modification of objectivities. In part two, I explore the intentional structure of patience as it differs from other intentional states (such as waiting and expectation) directed toward the now and future. I then try in part three to describe more precisely the distinctive ways patience intends – is given in and discloses – the past, present, and future.

Session 9

11:15-12:45, Friday 15 June.

Time-Consciousness in Brentano and Husserl

Norio Murata (Tokai University)

Here I try to draw the outline of Husserl's *Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* as the solution of some problems raised from Brentano's theory of time consciousness. Brentano regards the temporal change as that of content of presentation (a). What type of contents? In *Descriptive Psychology* he distinguishes sensation which is caused by stimulus or excitation of nerve (b), and proteraeesthesia which corresponds to no stimulus. Sensation as momentary present is the limit of temporal continuity and has in itself no temporal extension (c). Brentano thinks that temporal determinations do not belong to sensation but only to proteraeesthesia because they are derivative and generated by modification. In his *Lectures*, Husserl answers to the problem (b) by defining the primal impression as present consciousness, by shutting out stimulus and introducing temporal determination. To (c) by widening of the concept of perception with retention and enabling perception of concrete successive objects. To (a) by adopting the mode theory which attributes temporal change to the modes of act of apprehension. Finally, I compare this mode theory with the notorious 'apprehension-content scheme'. If the "dogma of momentariness of a whole of consciousness" formulated by Stern is taken into account as criterium of what Husserl tries to avoid, then this dogma can be equally applied both to Brentano's content theory and to that "scheme". I show that Husserl's theory presupposes no such dogma.

Time, Tense and Timeless Propositions

Mark Roberts (Franciscan University of Steubenville)

Husserl, Pfänder and other early phenomenologists followed Bolzano by accepting his view that it is propositions understood as timeless entities that are true or false. However, little work was done by the early phenomenologists regarding the relationship of sentences to propositions specifically with respect to the tense of sentences. What is the logical relationship between tensed sentences to timeless propositions which it seems cannot be tensed if they are timeless? Or must one hold that strictly speaking sentences expressing propositions cannot be tensed? Further questions can be raised regarding the relationship between timeless true propositions and temporally obtaining states of affairs that account for their truth which seems to suggest that there must be temporal elements in such propositions although they are timeless. My paper addresses these and other related issues along with a consideration of whether adjustments must be made to our understanding of tense and propositions depending upon whether a proposition is contingently or necessarily true. Must contingently true propositions correspond to temporally obtaining states of affairs, and necessarily true ones to timelessly obtaining states of affairs? In considering these and related issues I will be critical of views on this issue by some philosophers prior to Bolzano.

Session 10

15:30-17:00, Friday 15 June.

Time of Repetition. Habits and Conceptuality in Husserl and Heidegger

Giulia Lanzirotti (University of Turin)

By taking into account Husserl and Heidegger's work, the aim of this presentation is to indicate that the notion of "repetition" (*Wiederholung*) represents the peculiar kind of temporality that underpins the dimension of both habits and conceptuality. In order to understand how the phenomenon of repetition lays at the basis of our experience in the world, in which we move thanks to our practice and concepts, I will focus on Husserl's posthumous *Experience and Judgment* (EJ) and Heidegger's early phenomenology. In *EJ*, Husserl briefly mentions the notion of *repetition* as intertwined to that of *type* (*Typus*). First, I shall argue that Husserl's notion of *Typus* entails the specific temporality of repetition that, consequently, involves the genesis of practices and concepts. Second, I will consider Heidegger's analyses of our being-in-the-world, eminently characterized by our everyday dealing and practices, whose inner articulation may be read in virtue of Husserl's notion of *Typus*. In fact, it is possible to interpret Heidegger's understanding of the dimension of practices as embracing not only the phenomenon of our habits but also that of conceptuality. Thus, they both should be understood as resulting from an experience intended as specifically typified.

"Temporal being is finite. Eternal being is infinite." Individuality and Time-Consciousness in the Philosophy of Edith Stein

Anna Jani (Pázmány Péter Catholic University - Budapest)

Already in her habilitation work *Potency and Act*, Edith Stein drew a sharp distinction between the experienced thing that exists in memory and thing that exists independently of the subject. Stein distinguished these two types of being by virtue of the scholastic categories of potency and act, which directed her interest to the complex problem of temporal and atemporal being. Even though her habilitation work was dedicated to Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time* and her thinking benefited a lot from *Being and Time* in her last philosophical work *Finite and Eternal Being* as well, she stood in a critical opposition to Heidegger's ideas. In parallel with finishing *Finite and Eternal Being* she studied Heidegger's works and lectures from the 1930s and contrasted Heidegger's thesis with Hedwig Conrad-Martius' interpretation of temporality and temporal being. These two concepts constitute the basis for Stein's personal interpretation of temporal and eternal being. In my talk I will attempt to present the complexity of Stein's own interpretation of eternal being in the context of the phenomenological approaches to temporality and the theological doctrine of eternal being.

Session 11

17:15-18:45, Friday 15 June.

Time, Aging, and Death in the Thought of Max Scheler

Susi Gottlöber (Maynooth University)

As can be seen from the lecture notes on *Das Wesen des Todes* from 1923/24 the later Scheler developed a keen interest in the phenomena of aging and death. This paper intends to investigate not only Scheler's understanding of both phenomena but, in addition, the connection to a third question: Scheler's understanding of time. While the phenomena of death and aging on the one hand, and time on the other, are clearly distinct, a more detailed investigation also reveals a close connection: it becomes clear that the phenomenon of aging cannot be properly understood without the role of time. We will proceed in three steps: First, we need to establish the foundations by defining the phenomena of life (as original phenomenon/*Urphänomen*) and time (in its two forms of objective and absolute time) from a Schelerian perspective. In a second step we will focus on outlining and analysing Scheler's position on the phenomena of aging and death. It will be here that the role of time for the aging process will slowly start to emerge. Following from these investigations we can then, in a third and final step, attempt an initial cautious establishment of this connection between aging and time and its potential role for Scheler's Philosophical Anthropology.

Time, Eternity, and the Transition from Phenomenology to Metaphysics in Edith Stein and Edmund Husserl

William Tullius (Gonzaga University)

Eric Voegelin criticized 19th and 20th century philosophy, including phenomenology, for its preoccupation with the analysis of immanent time-consciousness, arguing that the analysis of time had become a mere substitute for meditation on God and that philosophy failed to move beyond the domain of immanent temporality to the eternal. However, in Chapter Two of Edith Stein's *Finite and Eternal Being*, in which an analysis of time-consciousness terminates in an intuition into the category of eternal being and, likewise, in select manuscripts where Husserl appropriates the Platonic symbolism of *anamnesis* as a temporal irruption of the eternal into the stream of consciousness, we have the example of two phenomenologists whose analysis of time consciousness terminates precisely in meditation upon God and the eternal. On the other hand, it is not infrequent that both Stein and Husserl are criticized as having moved beyond the limits of pure phenomenology and as having breached its methodological restrictions in these texts. I argue that while both thinkers do indeed transgress the limits of phenomenological methodology, this is not *philosophically* problematic, but represents the teleological aims of phenomenological inquiry as an '*erste Philosophie*' to be completed by a metaphysics as '*letzte Philosophie*'. Moreover, I argue that a methodological accounting for the leading clues which guide both Stein and Husserl beyond the purely phenomenological domain in their contemplation of divine, eternal being are nonetheless still grounded in experience, although a picture of experience which, as Voegelin rightly argues, requires explication through other than a purely phenomenological analysis.