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(1991) On truth, Dordrecht, Springer.

Truth and coherence

Frank P. Ramsey, Nicholas Rescher, Ulrich Majer

pp. 25-42

Let us take the Coherence Theory first; this holds that the truth of a belief that A is B depends not on whether A is in fact B but on how far the belief that it is forms part of a coherent system. It is a theory which is very easy to reduce to absurdity and after Mr Russell's amusing essay on "The Monistic Theory of Truth"1 it is difficult to see how anyone can still cling to it; but the defect of all refutations by reductio ad ahsurdum is that they do not reveal where the line of thought which leads to the absurdity first goes astray. According to Mr Russell the first mistake of the advocates of the Coherence Theory lies in their assuming an abstract metaphysical axiom called the Axiom of Internal Relations, but some of their arguments seem to me not to depend on any such axiom but to arise from confusions of a simpler sort such as ensnare not only the abstruse metaphysician but also the common man.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-3738-6_3

Full citation:

Ramsey, F.P. , Rescher, N. , Majer, U. (1991). Truth and coherence, in On truth, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 25-42.

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